Texas A&M University School of Law

Texas A&M Law Scholarship
Faculty Scholarship
10-2022

Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACS) and the SEC
Neal Newman
Lawrence J. Trautman

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Banking and Finance Law Commons, Business
Organizations Law Commons, Secured Transactions Commons, and the Securities Law Commons

SPECIAL PURPOSE ACQUISITION COMPANIES
(SPACS) AND THE SEC
Neal F. Newman∗
Lawrence J. Trautman∗∗
ABSTRACT
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) are simply
enterprises that raise money from the public with the intention of purchasing
an existing business and becoming publicly traded in the securities markets.
If the SPAC is successful in raising money and the acquisition takes place,
the target company takes the SPAC’s place on a stock exchange in a
transaction that resembles a public offering. Also known as “blank-check”
or “reverse merger” companies, this process avoids many of the pitfalls of a
traditional initial public offering.
During late 2020 and 2021 an unprecedented surge in the popularity
and issuance of Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACSs) took
place. John Coates, the SEC’s Acting Director of the Division of
Corporation Finance, observed, “Concerns include risks from fees, conflicts,
and sponsor compensation, from celebrity sponsorship and the potential for
retail participation drawn by baseless hype, and the sheer amount of capital
pouring into the SPACS, each of which is designed to hunt for a private target
to take public.”
We discuss this popular approach to capital formation within the
context of the securities issuance process and examine the robust market for
SPAC issuance during 2020 and 2021. Financial reporting and auditing
considerations are examined, along with regulatory concerns. Several
examples of these offerings are provided. We believe this paper adds to the
discussion and understanding of this widely employed financing mechanism.
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OVERVIEW
During late 2020 and 2021 an unprecedented surge in the popularity
and issuance of Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACSs) took
place. Regulator John Coates, the SEC’s Acting Director of the Division of
Corporation Finance, observed that his, “Concerns include risks from fees,
conflicts, and sponsor compensation, from celebrity sponsorship and the
potential for retail participation drawn by baseless hype, and the sheer
amount of capital pouring into the SPACS, each of which is designed to hunt
for a private target to take public.”1
Our article proceeds in seven parts. First, we explain Special Purpose
Acquisition Companies (SPACs) and their benefits, and we introduce the
issuance process basics. Second, we examine the recent robust market for
SPAC issuance during 2020 and 2021. Third, we offer a detailed discussion
of the securities issuance process as applicable to SPACs. Fourth, we look
at financial reporting and auditing considerations. Fifth, we provide an
example of Topps Co.’s failed attempt at public listings of their securities
via the SPAC process. Sixth, we take a look at a recent SPAC enforcement
action by the SEC. Lastly, we conclude. SPACs have provided a source of
needed capital during 2020 and 2021. We believe this paper adds to the
discussion and understanding of this widely employed financing mechanism.

1. John Coates, SPACs, IPOs and Liability Risk Under the Securities Laws, SEC (Apr.
8,
2021),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/spacs-ipos-liability-risk-undersecurities-laws [https://perma.cc/75UA-AH6G].
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WHAT IS A SPAC?

Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) are simply
enterprises that raise money from the public with the intention of purchasing
an existing business, thereby achieving liquidity and becoming publiclytraded in the securities markets. According to the SEC, the popularity of
SPACs is due, at least in part, to the belief that “a private company can
become a publicly traded company with more certainty as to pricing and
control over deal terms as compared to traditional initial public offerings.”2
In sum:
These types of transactions, most commonly where a SPAC acquires or
merges with a private company, occur after, often many months or more than
a year after, the SPAC has completed its own IPO. Unlike an operating
company that becomes public through a traditional IPO, however, a SPAC
is a shell company when it becomes public. This means that it does not have
an underlying operating business and does not have assets other than cash
and limited investments, including the proceeds from the IPO.3
A. Benefits
If the SPAC is successful in raising money and the acquisition takes
place, “the target company takes the SPAC’s place on a stock exchange, in
a transaction that resembles a public offering.”4 Also known as “blankcheck” or “reverse merger” companies, this process avoids many of “the
pitfalls of a traditional initial public offering.”5 Although receiving a robust
investor response during 2020 and early 2021, this financial device is not
new. One of your authors, Professor Trautman, a former New York City
investment banker at Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette and past-president of the
New York City and Washington / Baltimore chapters of the National
Association of Corporate Directors (NACD), successfully employed this
strategy many years ago to capitalize a start-up oil and gas company during
2. What You Need to Know About SPACs ― Updated Investor Bulletin, SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N (May 25, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-and-bulletins/what-youneed-know-about-spacs-investor-bulletin [https://perma.cc/P8K3-FZKA].
3. Id. See also Yochanan Shachmurove & Milos Vulanovic, SPAC IPOs, OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF IPOS, (Douglas Cumming & Sofia Johan, eds., forthcoming 2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2898102 [https://perma.cc/6DE4-J29G] (discussing SPACs’
performances since their IPOs).
4. Dave Michaels, SPAC Warrants Draw SEC Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2021, at
B1.
5. Peter Santilli & Amrith Ramkumar, Financial Conditions Fuel Creation of BlankCheck Firms, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 2021, at B9.
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a global recession and historical downturn in petroleum prices.6 This took
place during a time when West Texas Intermediate Crude was trading at
about nine dollars a barrel and traditional bank financing for petroleum assets
in Texas was essentially non-existent because most regional banks were in
the process of failing and being acquired by institutions outside the region.
The Trautman-led group of investors was able to take a moribund shell of a
company that had been in the SEC reporting system for years and employ its
publicly-traded securities and traditional bank financing from outside the
Texas region to acquire oil assets at historically depressed prices. Fast
forward and this entity is now successfully listed on the New York Stock
Exchange.7 Connor Moore, National Leader of KPMG Private Enterprise,
cautions those considering a SPAC:
Speed is often touted as a key benefit for merging with a SPAC. But
the reality is that SPACs are not simple transactions. They are closely
regulated by the SEC, which means sellers must still complete the normal
SEC filing requirements, audit requirements, and due diligence processes.
And they must do it all in a compressed timeline. Many private companies
simply don’t have the appropriate processes or structures in place to do it all
properly in an aggressive timeframe.8
B. The Process
In short, the registrant files a registration statement with the
Commission that simply documents the SPAC investment, disclosing an
abbreviated fact pattern since the traditional history, description of business,
risk factors, and financials are not yet available for an unknown target
acquisition. After successfully raising money, “SPACs typically have two
years to complete a deal or they must return the remaining IPO proceeds to
the investors. ‘Lately [in 2021], many have only needed a few months to

6. See generally Comstock Res., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 17, 2021),
https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/23194/000002319421000015/crk20201231.htm [https://perma.cc/8KT6-G8LD] (describing Comstock’s business, operations,
and strategies).
7. Lawrence J. Trautman, Present at the Creation: Reflections on the Early Years of the
National Association of Corporate Directors, 17 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 1, 21 (2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2296427 [https://perma.cc/A96T-VHAR].
8. The
Reality
of
SPAC
Mergers,
KPMG
(Mar.
5,
2021),
https://www.kpmg.us/insights/2021/ps82-reality-spacmergers.html?utm_source=google&utm_medium=cpc&mid=m00004742&utm_campaign=c-00101688&cid=c00101688&gclid=CjwKCAjwjdOIBhA_EiwAHz8xmysrM_oqCEzvIo2vsrz0Df6dcJPRWb
X6Q-j3YsDFvxI0zlqh_-pcEBoCQucQAvD_BwE [https://perma.cc/3EFN-Y3TU].
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announce mergers.’9 One of the major benefits of employing the SPAC
vehicle for private firms is that “their valuation is finalized with a small
group of . . . [negotiators] behind closed doors before a deal is announced.
[While] in a traditional IPO [initial public offering], pricing can change
[dramatically] until the night before shares start trading.”10 The Wall Street
Journal reports:
In the stock market, the SPAC has three lives. The first comes
after the IPO, when the company’s only asset typically is $10 in
cash per share. The stock trades around $10, and savvy investors
can make money anytime the price falls too low by getting cash at
a discount.
The second occurs after the merger is announced, when the shares
often swing based on how investors perceive the deal.
The third happens after the merger is completed, when the shares
rise and fall based on the new company’s outlook, just like any
other stock. Because the private firm gets the SPAC’s place on a
stock exchange, the name of the stock and ticker symbol typically
change to reflect the name of the newly public company.11
Professors Gahng, Ritter and Zhang demonstrate that:
From a private operating company’s point of view . . . merging
with a SPAC is much more expensive than a traditional IPO. The
cost to the median company of going public, as a percentage of
post-merger or post-issue market cap, is 14.6% when merging with
a SPAC, vs. 3.2% when using a traditional IPO.12
Gahng, Ritter and Zhang question, “Then why do some companies still
choose a SPAC merger over a traditional IPO?”13 Accordingly, they
“identify the economic roles of SPAC sponsors and SPAC IPO investors and
how these roles can create relative advantages of merging with a SPAC.”14
Consider:
Specifically, for some operating companies, it is believed that
merging with a SPAC is a quicker way to raise capital and go
public than a traditional IPO. Although our numbers do not
support the idea that merging with a SPAC is necessarily faster
than conducting a traditional IPO, we posit that the conventional
9. Santilli & Ramkumar, supra note 5.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Minmo Gahng, Jay R. Ritter & Donghang Zhang, SPACs 41 (Feb. 22, 2021)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3775847 [https://perma.cc/V3Z2-FP3T]
13. Id.
14. Id.
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wisdom that ‘merging with a SPAC is faster’ influences the
decision making. . . . Importantly, until recently, the conventional
wisdom was that the merger permits the sponsor to make forwardlooking statements that fall under the safe harbor provisions of
U.S. merger law, whereas a traditional IPO does not offer these
safe harbor provisions, although recent statements from the SEC
may reduce this regulatory arbitrage. Furthermore, the redemption
option that SPAC public shareholders have incentivizes the SPAC
sponsor to negotiate a deal that is favorable to both the operating
company and the SPAC shareholders, in order to induce the
shareholders to approve the merger and not redeem their
shares. . . . Alternatively stated, the redemption option helps align
sponsor and public shareholder interests.
We document that the sponsors frequently take haircuts in order to
ensure that the SPAC has enough cash to consummate the merger. Sponsors
often give up some of their shares (17% on average) and/or warrants (19%
on average). Frequently, these forfeitures are transferred to some existing
shareholders to induce them not to redeem, or to PIPE investors to induce
them to inject cash. Furthermore, the IPO underwriters sometimes agree to
forego some of their deferred compensation to ensure the completion of a
merger. Importantly, these haircuts are state-contingent: sponsors take larger
haircuts and provide more inducements, and underwriters surrender
commissions more, for weaker deals. Increasingly, some sponsor shares are
subject to vesting provisions, resulting in additional forfeitures if stock price
targets are not achieved. Thus, we show that average sponsor profits are not
as lucrative as sometimes assumed, especially for underperforming deals.15
Professors Rodrigues and Stegemoller observe that SPAC:
contract design borrows heavily from private equity’s playbook.
Private equity managers famously (and sometimes
controversially) receive 20% of their fund’s profits, and funds
typically last only ten years. From the traditional 20% incentive
compensation to a short investment shelf life, SPAC entrepreneurs
tried to transfer many hallmarks of the private equity contract to
the public market.16
Courtesy of professors Chong, Zhong, Li, Li, Agrawal, and Zhang,

15. Id. at 41–42.
16. Usha Rodrigues & Mike Stegemoller, Exit, Voice, and Reputation: The Evolution of
SPACS 1 (U. Ga. Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper Series, Paper No. 11-12,
2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1948642 [https://perma.cc/3N2W-JKYP].

OF ENNSYLVANIA OURNAL OF

17. Eason Chong et al.,

USINESS AW

3 (June 11, 2021) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3862186 [https://perma.cc/XF63-SZRB].
18
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ROBUST MARKET FOR SPAC ISSUANCE

Rampant capital formation has become available to many early-stage
enterprises upon attractive pricing terms not historically achievable during
most traditional initial public offering environments. By January 2021, The
Wall Street Journal observed, “The hottest thing in finance is four letters
long . . . It’s called a SPAC, and increasingly it is the favored source of
financing for private companies looking to go public . . . Nearly 300 SPACs
are now seeking deals, armed with about $90 billion in cash.”19 During the
first month of 2021 alone, “more are rolling out at a furious clip ― so far
this year, an average of five new SPACs launched each business day.”20
Consider that during just the first three weeks of January 2021, “SPACs are
pulling in more than 70% of all money raised through initial public
offerings . . . up from nearly half last year and about 20% the year before.”21
And during the first three weeks of January 2021 alone, “the 67 SPACs
created . . . have already raked in nearly $20 billion from investors. That is
well above the total from all of 2019, which was a record before last year’s
historic haul of $82 billion.”22 These developments come at a time following
Administration change, new leadership at the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission,23 volatile securities markets,24 emerging technologies such as

19. Amrith Ramkumar & Maureen Farrell, Attack of the SPACs, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23,
2021, at B1.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See Press Release 2021—65, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Gary Gensler Sworn in as
Member of the SEC (Apr. 17, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-65
[https://perma.cc/CH2G-QZHX] (evidencing a change in SEC leadership).
24. See generally Lawrence J. Trautman, Personal Ethics & the U.S. Financial Collapse
of 2007–08 (Aug. 12, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2502124
[https://perma.cc/5VNU-KSS6] (discussing numerous problems intertwined with the
markets.
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virtual currencies25 and initial coin offerings26 that require new regulatory
structures to keep pace.27
Harvard professor Max Bazerman and co-author Paresh Patel provide
this overview: “In 2019, 59 [SPACs] were created, with $13 billion invested;
in 2020, 247 were created, with $80 billion invested; and in the first quarter
alone of 2021, 295 were created, with $96 billion invested . . . In 2020, SPACs
accounted for more than 50% of new publicly listed U.S. companies.”28 While
announced or completed SPAC mergers are too numerous to list, a few sample
transactions include: NYSE parent’s crypto unit Bakkt (expected valuation
approaching $2.1 billion);29 maker of small rockets Astra Space (announced

25. See generally Lawrence J. Trautman & George P. Michaely, The SEC & The Internet:
Regulating the Web of Deceit, 68 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 262 (2014),
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1951148 [https://perma.cc/VB5P-8RDQ] (describing cybersecurities challenges that are the result of the evolution of Internet technology and capital
formation); Lawrence J. Trautman, Virtual Currencies: Bitcoin & What Now After Liberty
Reserve, Silk Road, and Mt. Gox?, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 13 (2014),
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2393537 [https://perma.cc/FSR4-CYY6] (describing virtual
currency regulation, payment systems, and cybercrimes); Lawrence J. Trautman et al.,
Governance of The Internet of Things (IoT), 60 JURIMETRICS 315 (2020),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=3443973 [https://perma.cc/YKD2-QJLH] (highlighting challenges
facing humans in corralling and regulating the vastness of the Internet); Lawrence J. Trautman
& Alvin C. Harrell, Bitcoin Versus Regulated Payment Systems: What Gives?, 38 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1041 (2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2730983 [https://perma.cc/7NMV-XCRL]
(addressing Bitcoin and other virtual currencies as they interact with legal and financial
systems); Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Disruptive Blockchain Technology the Future of
Financial
Services?,
69
CONSUMER
FIN.
L.Q.
REP.
232
(2016),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2786186 [https://perma.cc/CB6R-A8VF] (underscoring the
promises and challenges financial service providers must endure as blockchain technology
revolutionizes financial services).
26. See generally Neal Newman & Lawrence J. Trautman, Securities Law: Overview and
Contemporary Issues, 16 OHIO ST. BUS. L.J. 149 (2021), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3790804
[https://perma.cc/QC2W-C42P] (analyzing Bitcoin and other virtual currencies).
27. See generally Lawrence J. Trautman, Bitcoin, Virtual Currencies and the Struggle of
Law and Regulation to Keep Pace, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 447 (2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3182867
[https://perma.cc/7KKD-UVCU]
(describing
technological changes such as blockchain that disperse quicker than laws and regulations);
Lawrence J. Trautman, Rapid Technological Change and U.S. Entrepreneurial Risk in
International Markets: Focus on Data Security, Information Privacy, Bribery and
Corruption, 49 CAP. U.L. REV. 67 (2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2912072
[https://perma.cc/L624-4GRL] (emphasizing the risks associated with rapid technological
change and Internet growth).
28. Max H. Bazerman & Paresh Patel, SPACs: What You Need to Know, HARV. BUS.
REV.,
July–Aug.
2021,
https://hbr.org/2021/07/spacs-what-you-need-to-know
[https://perma.cc/K8Z4-7DN5].
29. Alexander Osipovich, NYSE Parent’s Crypto Unit to Go Public, WALL ST. J., Jan.
12, 2021, at B1.

2022]

SPECIAL PURPOSE ACQUISITION

649

$2.1 billion valuation;30 electric air-taxi developer Archer;31 quantumcomputing start-up IonQ ($2 billion valuation);32 shared-office provider
WeWork ($9 billion announced valuation);33 and ride-hailing company Grab
Holdings Inc. (near-$40 billion valuation),34 just to name a few.
A. History of “Blind Pools”
As shown by Professor Trautman’s experience several decades ago,
“SPACs have actually been around for decades. Their predecessors—known
as ‘blind pools’―had a shady reputation on Wall Street in the 1980s because
they were tied to penny-stock fraud.”35 Some younger readers of this article
may not be aware that the market reception to new issuances is very cyclical
and not available to many at all during long stretches of months or years.
During recent years, “SPACs turned hot for brief periods in the ‘90s, then
again in the 2000s, only to fade with market crashes or a surge in traditional
IPOs. New laws and regulations helped booster their reputation, as did
changes [helping] investors to get their money back before a deal went
through.”36
B. Why SPACs? Why Now?
What are the motivating factors responsible for the popularity of the
SPAC financing vehicle? The Wall Street Journal reports, “These deals are
generating a lot of interest because they produce big paydays for their
creators, make it easier for startups in hot industries such as electric vehicles
to capitalize on a frothy run-up in the stock market and offer everyday
investors a new path to a hot stock.”37 In retrospect, it appears the gold rush
“began last March [2020] when the coronavirus pandemic hit, prompting
concerns the IPO market would be hampered for months. Some tech
companies and venture capitalists saw SPACs as a way to raise money
30. Andy Pasztor & Eliot Brown, Rocket Startup Set to Go Public at $2.1 Billion Value,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2021, at B7.
31. Jon Sindreu, Blank-Check Firms Take to Air, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2021, at B10.
32. Sara Gastellanos, Startup IonQ Plans its Public Debut in $2 Billion SPAC, WALL ST.
J., Mar 9, 2021, at B5.
33. Maureen Farrell & Elliot Brown, WeWork Set to Go Public in SPAC Merger, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 27–28, 2021, at A1.
34. Jing Yang & Maureen Farrell, Grab to Go Public in Record SPAC, WALL ST. J., Apr.
14, 2021, at A1.
35. Ramkumar & Farrell, supra note 19.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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without being subjected to the whims of the suddenly volatile stock
market.”38
During 2020 alone, “SPACs raised $82 billion in the U.S. . . . even as
the global pandemic sent shockwaves through businesses and households.
Underwriting those deals and other stock offerings created a surprisingly
good year for the biggest investment banks.”39 While these impressive
underwriting results were not all the result of SPACs, “Goldman’s equity
underwriting brought in a record $1.12 billion in fees in the fourth quarter,
nearly triple what it had the year before. For the year [results were] more
than double. . . .”40 Elsewhere, “because it was second in helping launch new
SPACs, [Citigroup, Inc.’s] equity underwriting revenue increased 83% in the
fourth quarter and 64% for the year. . . . And smaller Jefferies Financial
Group, Inc., a big SPAC supporter, . . . more than tripled its equity
underwriting fees.”41
Harvard professor Maria Lucia Passador writes, “Were we to distill
2020 into a single word, from the capital markets’ perspective at least, it
would certainly be SPACs, which ― although to a different extent ― are
now having their momentum on both shores of the pond.”42 Her study of
SPACs brought to market between January 2010 and December 2019 (preCovid) is intended to uncover structural changes and reasons for their recent
resurgence. Professor Passador contends that SPACs are likely to “evolve
for good” during the near future, “as they have showed themselves capable
of doing in the past, thus overcoming the problems and perplexities raised
about them.”43
In addition to investment banks and traditional institutional investorbacked venture capital firms, during the pandemic economy of 2020-21, a
number of celebrities and those with name recognition have become
promoters of SPACs. Among the rich and famous sponsors include:
entertainers Ciara, Sammy Hagar, and Jay-Z; sports figures Alex Rodriguez,
Steph Curry, Colin Kaepernick, Shaquille O’Neal, and Serena Williams;
former Oakland A’s manager Billy Beane—even “[f]ormer House Speaker
Paul Ryan joined one.”44 Sponsors from the world of business and finance
38. Id.
39. David Benoit, The Other SPAC Winners: Big Banks, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2021, at
B6.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Maria Lucia Passador, In Vogue Again: The Re-Rise of SPACs in the IPO market 1
(Bocconi Legal Stud., Research Paper No. 3820957; Univ. Lux., Law Working Paper No.
2021-005, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3820957 [perma.cc/D3MM-9DRQ].
43. Id.
44. See Steven Kurutz, Big Names Like a Once-Obscure Investment: The SPAC, N.Y.

PECIAL URPOSE

T
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, Feb. 28, 2021, at ST3 (discussing prominent individuals involved with SPACs);
Amrith Ramkumar,
W
S . J., Dec. 7, 2021, at B1
(SPAC sponsored by former President Donald Trump).
45
Amrith Ramkumar,
W
S . J., Mar. 18,
2021, at B1 (listing several individuals from the business and finance sector who are involved
with SPACs).
46. Ramkumar & Farrell,
note 19.
47
Andrew Ross Sorkin,
N.Y. T
, Apr.
1, 2021, at B1 (discussing a recent development regarding SPACs).
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With his usual bravado, Mr. Palihapitiya compared Virgin
Galactic to Tesla on the day of the deal’s announcement and
forecast that it would reach “profitability in mid-2021 and should
achieve real scale by ‘22.” The company published an illustrated
presentation for investors with financial projections out to 2023.
Mr. Palihapitiya sold the deal to public investors ― many of whom
were mesmerized by his words and the future of space travel ― in
part by investing $100 million of his own money into the business,
a demonstration of his commitment to the future of the company.
Yet this past month, without warning to all those investors who
had followed him into the stock, he sold those shares. “I hated to
do it but my balance sheet shrank by almost $2 billion this week,”
he wrote on Twitter. He maintains a significant stake in Virgin
Galactic through his holding company’s “sponsor” stake, which is
the equity that a SPAC’s founders receive in exchange for putting
the deal together and making a small investment.
The sale illustrated an uncomfortable truth about the SPACs that
are transforming the financial world: Investors and celebrities who
put their names behind the next big headline-grabbing merger can
exit long before any of those projections are ever realized or, in
many cases, missed. (Virgin Galactic’s flight timetable has
slipped, forcing it to revise its forecasts).48
Fast-forward to early May 2021 and The Wall Street Journal writes,
“Virgin Galactic reported first-quarter earnings six days after it originally
intended, following the Securities and Exchange Commission’s statement
that some special-purpose acquisition companies . . . have improperly
accounted for warrants. Redoing the numbers resulted in an extra $49
million expense, which made Virgin’s losses look steeper.”49
C. Warnings Emerge
As early as January 2021, cracks in the foundation of this enthusiastic
parade-to-market became noticed. The Wall Street Journal observed, “even
some of the people getting rich off the blank-check boom caution that the
euphoria could be part of a bubble that overvalues nascent companies. If it
bursts, it could leave a few insiders as winners while saddling individual
investors who got in late with big losses.”50 As we will discuss more fully
later in this article, in many ways sponsors of these investments enjoy
48. Id.
49. Jon Sindreu, Space SPACs Face Threat --- Investors Should Be Worried About
Regulators’ Eagerness to Cool the Market, WALL ST. J., May 12, 2021, at B12.
50. Ramkumar & Farrell, supra note 19.
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advantages from a relatively high benefit, low risk structure.51 This results
because of the transaction structure when the sponsors, as The Wall Street
Journal explains, “initially put up a small amount to cover expenses before
the SPAC goes public and then are typically allowed to buy 20% of the
company at a deep discount after the SPAC combines with another firm.
This allows them to generate returns several times their original
investment.”52
Following analysis of SPAC IPOs in the United States, professors
Blomkvist and Vulanovic conducted a study, “using a hand-collected data
set of the entire SPAC population since their emergence in 2003. [They]
find that both the SPAC volume and SPAC share of total IPOs are negatively
related to market-wide uncertainty (VIX) and time-varying risk aversion
(variance risk premium).”53 Basing their results on data collected before the
late 2020 and early 2021 explosion in investor SPAC interest, Blomkvist and
Vulanovic, “attribute [their] findings to risk-averse investors’ reluctancy to
invest in opaque securities. In response, the SPAC sponsor can credibly
signal the issue’s quality by increasing their ‘skin in the game’ through the
purchase of additional warrants.”54
Well-connected executives, private equity (PE) firms, or hedge fund
sponsors of SPACS are often criticized because they, “receive a ‘promote’ a material equity stake in the SPAC for a nominal purchase price - and
options to purchase warrants in the SPAC, and these benefits often
materialize significant profits for the sponsor, even on companies that
struggle post-SPAC, because of the promotes exceptionally low acquisition
cost.”55 Bill Ackman, a prominent hedge fund billionaire, “has specifically
criticized the ‘misaligned incentives’ in the compensation structure of
SPACs between sponsor interests and ordinary investors (including longterm shareholders) since the discounted shares, and other standard fees,
create a ‘drag’ on the latter’s returns.”56 Professor Ryan Clements refers to
the Klausner, Ohlrogge, and Ruan study57 to:
51. See infra Part IV (discussing financial reporting and auditing considerations).
52. Ramkumar & Farrell, supra note 19.
53. See Magnus Blomkvist & Milos Vulanovic, SPAC IPO Waves, 197 ECON. LETTERS
(2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3686498 [perma.cc/K3H7-P668] (discussing the results of
their study on SPACs).
54. Id.
55. See Ryan Clements, Misaligned Incentives in Markets: Envisioning Finance That
Benefits All of Society, DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 1, 28 (2021),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3802178 [perma.cc/WUA9-V7PE] (describing a feature given to
several individuals and entities in a SPAC deal).
56. Id.
57. Michael Klausner, Michael Ohlrogge & Emily Ruan, A Sober Look at SPACs, 39
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identify an additional “incentive misalignment” between sponsors
and ordinary investors in the common practice of the sponsors
infusing the SPAC initial public offering with several hundred
million dollars because the investment will be lost if a merger
doesn’t take place; therefore the sponsor may pressure the SPAC
to merge on terms unattractive to long-term shareholders.58
Professor Mira Ganor observes that, “shareholder action is exercised
mainly through a binary system: for example, the shareholders vote either to
approve a proposal or to reject it.”59 Because almost half of U.S. IPO
transactions have been in the form of SPACs, Professor Ganor offers this,
“is one example that illustrates the weakness of the binary system and the
consequent vulnerability of small and unsophisticated shareholders.
Remarkably, investors in SPACs can vote ‘yes’ on management proposed
acquisition transactions and nonetheless, simultaneously choose to redeem
their shares.”60 Therefore, “Unsophisticated retail investors may not realize
that they, as well, will be better off if they redeem their shares even though
the transaction received the approval of the majority of the shareholder
vote.”61 Professor Ganor advances:
a proposal to amend the law and allow shareholders to act in a way
that is contingent on a simultaneous non-contingent action by
other shareholders. For example, a shareholder of a SPAC should
be able to choose to redeem her shares if and only if at least a
specified percentage of redemption rights are exercised
unconditionally. Similarly, a shareholder who has preemptive
rights should have the right to exercise her rights with a limit that
caps her participation and maintains her percentage holdings in the
company.
Generally, shareholders should have the option to act contingently
when they are exercising a shareholder right, such as preemptive rights or
appraisal rights, and when they are given a choice to participate in
transactions such as tender offers and stock-buybacks. Unlike mandatory
disclosure rules imposed on insiders, the proposed non-binary, contingent,
shareholder action treats all shareholders equally and increases the power of
the shareholder’s action without incurring high costs of collaboration and
YALE
J.
REG.
(forthcoming
2022)
(hereinafter
Klausner,
et.
al.),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3720919 [perma.cc/S9BW-XJT9].
58. See Clements, supra note 55, at 28; see also infra §IV (discussing regarding corporate
governance).
59. Mira Ganor, The Case for Non-Binary, Contingent, Shareholder Action, 23 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 390, 390 (2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3530596 [perma.cc/8U8M-J952].
60. Id. at 391.
61. Id. at 408.
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communication among the shareholders.62
D. After-Market Price Performance
In a study and analysis of 47 SPACs that merged between January 2019
and June 2020, Professors Klausner, Ohlrogge, and Ruan find “that costs
embedded in the SPAC structure are subtle, opaque, higher than has been
previously recognized, and higher than the cost of an IPO.”63 Consider:
Although SPACs raise $10.00 per share from investors in their
IPOs, by the time a SPAC merges with a private company to take
it public, the SPAC holds far less in net cash per share to contribute
to the combined company. For SPACs that merged during our
primary sample period of January 2019 through June 2020, mean
and median net cash per share were $4.10 and $5.70, respectively.
Between June 2020 and November 2021, net cash per share was
somewhat higher but far below $10. We find that SPAC costs are
not born by the companies they take public, but instead by the
SPAC shareholders who hold shares at the time SPACs merge.
These investors experience steep post-merger losses, while SPAC
sponsors profit handsomely.64
Klausner et al. conclude, “by suggesting that the SEC promulgate
disclosure requirements specific to SPAC mergers that make clear SPACs’
costs and sponsors’ incentives, and that equalize regulatory preferences that
SPACs enjoy compared to IPOs.”65 During July 2021, Professors Gahng,
Ritter, and Zhang write:
From an investor’s point of view, between the SPAC IPO and the
business combination or liquidation, we find lucrative riskadjusted returns considering the downside protected nature of the
investment. Specifically, for 210 SPAC IPOs purchased at the
offer price from January 2010 – December 2019, the average
annualized return during this SPAC period has been 15.9%, with
all 210 returns being positive. Investing in SPAC IPOs can be
viewed as investing in underpriced default-free convertible bonds
with extra warrants. Our back of the envelope calculation shows
that the SPAC IPO investors are being given free warrants.
On the other hand, investor returns in the deSPAC period on the merged
companies are mixed. For the 114 SPACs that completed a merger with an
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 391.
Klausner, et al., supra note 57, at 1.
Id.
Id.
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operating company from January 2012 − September 2020, weighting each
deal equally, common share investors have lost money on average, while
warrant investors have earned positive returns. The equally weighted
average one-year return on the merged company shares has been -8.1%,
underperforming the market by 24.7%. However, investor returns on a
dollar-weighted basis are not as bad as the EW numbers would suggest, with
a dollar-weighted average return of 4.5%. This improvement is due to the
tendency for investors to redeem many of the shares for the mergers that
generate disappointing subsequent returns. For the 105 out of 114 merged
companies that had outstanding warrants, the EW average one-year return
has been 68.0%. Consequently, focusing exclusively on the EW common
share returns paints a worse picture of the deSPAC period investment returns
than the average public investor experience.66
During April 2021, The Wall Street Journal reported that three new
exchange-traded funds were playing the SPAC market, with a mixed verdict
thus far.67 Also during April 2021, headlines start to appear warning,
“SPACs’ Red-Hot Streak Begins To Cool: Increased regulatory scrutiny of
alternative path to going public puts damper on trend.”68 During May 2021,
a Thompson Reuters study found that over 100 SPACs “that announced
mergers this year on average have gained under 2% from the price they
traded at when they first listed on the stock exchange. Most . . . began
trading last year, and the group’s median performance has trailed the S&P
500 by 15 percentage points.”69 Professors Gahng, Ritter, and Zhang
observe:
The SPAC market has experienced rapid changes recently. In the
first quarter of 2021, 298 SPACs went public with an average firstday return of 3.7%. This is a significant jump from the 1.6%
average in 2020, which was already higher compared to prior
years. Until the end of 2020, the SPAC period return was mostly
realized when the merger is announced. However, the average
first-day return of 3.7% in the first quarter of 2021 shows that the
66. See Gahng, Ritter & Zhang, supra note 12, at 40–41; see also Tim Jenkinson &
Miguel Sousa, Why SPAC Investors Should Listen to the Market, 21 J. APPLIED FIN.
(2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2691586 [https://perma.cc/XB84-3X2T] (asserting that
investors should pay close attention when investing in SPACs).
67. Tim Mullaney, The SPAC Attack Spreads to ETFs, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2021, at R5
(describing how SPACs have spread to the ETF market).
68. Dave Michaels, Amrith Rankumar & Alexander Osipovich, SPACs’ Red-Hot Streak
Begins to Cool, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2021, at A1.
69. Noel Randewich, Analysis: SPAC Returns Trail S&P 500 as Retail Investors Temper
Interest, REUTERS (May 4, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/business/spac-returns-trail-sp500-retail-investors-temper-interest-2021-05-04/ [perma.cc/8D9F-2DEC].
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market started to reprice the SPAC units immediately, reducing
the abnormal returns for investors who purchase SPACs in the
market, similar to what we find for operating company IPOs.70
According to BoardRoomAlpha.com, “October through December
[2021] alone saw over 160 SPACs price IPOs (49 in December) for over $9B
in fresh SPAC capital. Though, in order to get these deals done, the terms
have gotten significantly sweeter for investors which, in turn, eats away at
the sponsor’s economic returns.”71 In addition:
[R]ampant issuance is still upon us and given that a large portion
of new issues in the last three months were from first time sponsor
groups, we’d expect to see a continuation of some of this behavior
in the new year, with increasingly advantageous investor terms
fueling it. . . . There are currently over 570 SPACs actively
looking for a merger target. 2022 will surely start to get some
SPACs nervous as their deal deadlines will start approaching in far
greater numbers than we have seen in 2020 and 2021. While
liquidations are certain to rise relative to historical numbers, we’d
expect most sponsors to do everything that they can to get
something over the finish line. That will translate to a much larger
increase in ‘bad’ SPAC deals than liquidations . . . Overall . . .
deal enthusiasm is muted with the majority of announced-deal
SPACs still trading close to NAV [net asset value] with about ¾
trading below their $10 offer prices.72
III.

THE SECURITIES ISSUANCE PROCESS

A. General
From a regulatory and compliance standpoint, a SPAC initial public
offering (IPO) works the same as a traditional IPO. The SPAC is required
to prepare a Registration Statement that needs to be filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission. Same as in the traditional IPO context, the
SPAC’s Registration Statement must be prepared in accordance with
Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X.73
Appropriate Risk Factors,
Description of the Business, Management Bios, and audited financial
70. See Gahng, Ritter & Zhang, supra note 12, at 42.
71. David Drapkin, SPAC Market Review – December 2021, BOARDROOMALPHA (Dec
29,
2021),
https://www.boardroomalpha.com/spac-market-review-december-2021/
[perma.cc/H32P-LXJ8].
72. Id.
73. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.10-229.1406 (2021); Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. §
210.1-01–210.13-02 (2021).
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statements need to be included in accordance with those Regulations.74 As
alluded to earlier, SPACs differ, however, from the traditional IPO issuance
process in that when the SPAC IPO is formed there is no company with
salable products or services. The SPAC is merely a shell company; an entity
formed for the sole purpose of researching, selecting, and acquiring a Target
Company.75 Accordingly, the disclosures in a SPAC IPO will revolve around
an explanation of how the SPAC structure works and the process involved
with researching, selecting, and acquiring a company that produces actual
goods or provides actual services (the Target Company or Target).76
B. SPAC IPO Proceeds
The share proceeds from SPAC IPOs are held in a trust.77 Those funds
are set aside for the sole purpose of funding the Target acquisition once the
Target has been researched and selected.78 As a benchmark figure, SPACs
will place at least 80% of the offering proceeds in the Trust account.79 Some
SPACs will place more in the Trust. That amount depends on anticipated
expenses involved in researching, selecting, and acquiring a Target.
Appreciate that, until the SPAC finds and acquires a Target, the SPAC will
have ongoing expenses related to operating as a publicly held company, not
the least of which are the ongoing periodic financial reports that must be filed
both quarterly and annually.
C. Structure of the Securities Being Offered
The shares offered in a SPAC IPO generally will consist of both a
common share and at least one or more warrants.80 A warrant gives the
warrant holder the right to buy shares in the SPAC at a specified price. The
combined share and warrants will comprise a unit.81 Thus, an investment in

74. See Form S-1 (directing that the S-1 portions be completed in accordance with
Regulation S-K provisions).
75. See Acquicor Technology Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Sept. 2, 2005), at
3,
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001337675/000095014905000576/f11842sv1.ht
m#110 [perma.cc/8R58-YJYN] (hereinafter Acquicor) (providing the registration details for
Acquicor’s blank check filing).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 3.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 2.
81. Id.

2022]

SPECIAL PURPOSE ACQUISITION

659

a SPAC IPO will garner the investor a common share coupled with one or
more warrants.82 The warrant terms typically allow the investor to purchase
additional shares after the SPAC’s acquisition of the Target Company has
been consummated.83 The warrant kickers are designed to create a value
added incentive to keep the initial investors as part of the deal once the SPAC
selects and acquires the Target. The purchase price in exercising the
warrants is often for a fraction of the unit price and the warrants will typically
convert to common shares at a one-to-one ratio; i.e., one warrant converts to
one common share.84
D. Redemption Rights for the SPAC Shareholders
A feature that is unique to SPACs is that they give the public
shareholder the right to redeem the shares they hold in the SPAC85 and
receive the investor’s pro-rata share of the funds held in the Trust in the form
of cash. This redemption right that the SPAC affords can create some
challenges for the SPAC. If a significant number of shareholders decide to
exercise their redemption rights, then the amount of capital held in the Trust
gets depleted, which can then compromise the SPAC’s ability to acquire a
suitable Target. Consequently, that SPAC may be in a position where it must
raise additional funds in order to consummate a business combination.
E. The SPAC Shares Issued to the Promoters
The SPAC “Promoters,” comprised of the founding SPAC directors,
officers, and initial shareholders (collectively the “SPAC Promoters” or
“Promoters”), will take an equity stake in the SPAC as well; typically, a 20%
stake.86 The SPAC Promoters, however, will pay a fraction of what the
public shareholders will pay for their shares. For example, in one of the
82. Id.
83. Id. at 3.
84. Id. at 2.
85. Id. at 38.
86. See Acquicor, supra note 75, at 16 (detailing that 20 percent of Acquicor’s shares
will be owned by directors, officers, and special advisors); see also Valuence Merger Corp. I,
Registration
Statement
(Form
S-1)(Jan.
19,
2022),
at
65,
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001892747/000149315222001613/forms-1.htm
[https://perma.cc/Q9JN-3VX6] (listing another SPAC where initial shareholders will own
20% of the total shares); 10X Capital Venture Acquisition Corp. II, Registration Statement
(Form
S-1)
(Mar.
4,
2021),
at
29,
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001848898/000119312521068620/d123170ds1.h
tm#tx123170_9 [https://perma.cc/F6DW-MQ82] (stating that initial shareholders will own
25% of outstanding shares).
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SPAC IPOs used as a research reference for this article, the Promoters paid
$.004 per share for their shares. They paid a total of $25,000 and acquired
6,250,000 shares. By comparison, the public shareholders paid $6 for their
shares, paying a total of $150,000,000 and acquiring 25,000,000 shares,
comprising an 80% stake in the SPAC.87 Here in Exhibit 3 is a summary of
Acquicor’s projected capital structure just prior to its offering.
Exhibit 3

Summary of Acquicor’s projected capital structure just prior to its
offering88
The dynamic of dilution, where the promoters pay significantly less for
their equity stake in the SPAC, has been a subject of much criticism.89
F. The Target Acquisition Process
Once the SPAC’s infrastructure has been established, the SPAC can
move forward with its intended purpose, which is to find and acquire a
suitable Target Company. This section discusses how that process works.
Finding a suitable Target Company for the SPAC to acquire is the
lynchpin of the whole endeavor. In ideal circumstances, the SPAC will find
and acquire a Target Company early on in its eighteen to twenty–four month
window.90 And that Company will be one that grows, is profitable, and
appreciates in value over the ensuing years. Recent history indicates that
these endeavors rarely work out smoothly.91 Often, the process is a bumpy
87. Acquicor, supra note 75, at 28.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Acquicor, supra note 75, at 7 (detailing the timeline to find a target company).
91. See Ben Foldy, Lordstown Motors Discloses Justice Department Investigation as
Truck Launch Looms, WALL ST. J. (Jul. 16, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/electrictruck-startup-lordstown-motors-discloses-justice-department-investigation-11626443066
[perma.cc/UB5D-TMR4] (explaining the state and federal probes into the truck start-up’s
reverse merger).
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one fraught with myriad challenges and issues to address along the way. If
the SPAC fails to find a suitable Target Company, and no acquisition takes
place, then the whole endeavor is for naught and the SPAC venture will be
considered a failure. Therefore, a well-conceived SPAC is one that has been
intentional about the selection process long before the SPAC has even been
established.
A SPAC positioned for success is one where the Promoters have
industry knowledge, expertise, experience, and contacts in a specific field or
business sector and the promoter leverages these assets to find the ideal
Target.92 The final piece then is post-merger. Ultimate success for the
venture involves the SPAC positioning the Target for post-merger success.
Although offering circulars will note that the SPAC has neither
identified nor has been provided with the identity of any potential business
Targets,93 as an investor, you would hope and expect that the SPAC
Promoters have researched and assessed the viability of potential Targets
within the SPAC Promoters’ area of expertise and that this forethought has
occurred prior to the SPAC’s formation.
Accordingly, the SPAC Promoters will draw upon their contacts with
private equity firms, venture capital funds, public and private companies,
business brokers, investment bankers, attorneys and accountants, and
whatever other sources and contacts the Promoters can solicit to generate
suitable Target possibilities.94 In evaluating possible Target companies, the
Promoters will consider, among other things, the Target’s:
• financial condition and results of operations;
• growth potential;
• managerial experience and the availability of additional personnel;
• capital structure and capital requirements;
• competitive position and barriers to entry into the Target business’
industry;
• stage of development;
• degree of current or potential market acceptance;
• proprietary features and degree of intellectual property protection;
• regulatory environment of the Target business’ industry; and
• costs associated with effecting the business combination.95

92. See Acquicor, supra note 75, at 1 (highlighting the management team’s experience
in relevant industries).
93. Acquicor, supra note 75, at 33.
94. Id. at 35.
95. Id. at 36.
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These criteria are not exhaustive but give a good layout of what the
SPACs consider in the Target Company selection process. Again–the
thoughtfulness in the SPAC’s selection process is paramount to the venture’s
likelihood of overall success. Accordingly, many major investment banking
and prominent venture capital firms have found SPAC sponsorship to be a
highly lucrative activity during 2020 and 2021.96 In sum, a strong Target
selection sets the whole venture up for success.
G. Variables that weigh on the SPAC’s Selection Process – The
80% Minimum
The initial Target business or businesses that the SPAC acquires must
collectively have a fair market value equal to at least 80% of the SPAC’s net
assets at the time the Targets are being acquired.97 Recall that this 80%
minimum was placed in Trust for the sole purpose of acquiring a suitable
Target.98 The reasons for the 80% minimum are beyond this paper’s scope,
but the minimum dates back to an era when shell companies were used to
invest in penny stocks, sometimes resulting in fraudulent transactions.99 The
80% requirement was one of the protective measures used presumably to
protect the investors by ensuring that the bulk of the offering proceeds would
be used for acquiring the Target Company versus the money being allocated
elsewhere (i.e. back to the Promoters).
Note that the SPAC is not limited to purchasing just one Target
company. The criteria merely requires that 80% of the net assets then
existing in the trust be used at the time the acquisition occurs. Thus, the
SPAC is not limited to merging with just one Target. As a practical matter,
however, SPACs rarely end up acquiring more than one Target. The logistics
of acquiring two or more Targets at one time are formidable. At the forefront
of the challenges are the accounting and financial reporting that would be

96. Amrith Ramkumar, 2020 SPAC Boom Lifted Wall Street’s Biggest Banks, WALL ST.
J. (Jan. 5, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/2020-spac-boom-lifted-wall-streets-biggestbanks-11609842601 [perma.cc/L6AF-XDLB].
97. See Acquicor, supra note 75, at 36 (explaining the fair market value necessary at the
time of acquisition).
98. Acquicor, supra note 75, at 3.
99. See generally Daniel S. Riemer, Special Purpose Acquisition Companies: SPAC and
SPAN, or Blank Check Redux?, 85 WASH. U.L. REV. 931 (2007)
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1160&context=law_lawrevie
w [perma.cc/9NMN-K7NG] (discussing the history of blank check companies, how those
transactions have evolved into the current SPAC model, and how the evolution was due to the
fraud occurring under the blank check company model).
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required if the SPAC were to acquire more than one Target. If the SPAC
was to endeavor to acquire more than one Target, the SPAC would then be
required to prepare pro forma financial statements presenting the two Target
entities on a consolidated basis. The time, cost, and effort to address the
accounting issues alone can be enough to bog down the venture.
Accordingly, the SPAC dynamics lend themselves to selecting just one
Target company, thus underscoring the importance of choosing wisely, as
everything is riding on that single selection.
H. Further Challenges to Target Selection
Baked into the SPAC deal structure are stock preferences that can make
it challenging for the SPAC to complete its mission of acquiring an ideal
Target. First off, as mentioned earlier, shareholders have the right to convert
their shares into a pro rata number of trust shares and then redeem the share
value from the trust in cash.100 If a significant number of SPAC shareholders
decide to exercise their conversion rights, then the assets remaining in the
trust may be insufficient for acquiring a suitable Target. As shareholder
conversions are foreseeable and, in many cases, expected, SPACs have the
contingency plan in place of executing one or more private offerings to
counter the capital lost from conversions. These deals are called PIPEs
(Private Investment in Public Entities). The downside of a PIPE transaction
is the dilutive effect that a PIPE transaction may have on those shareholders
who choose to remain as shareholders post-merger. The SPAC may be
forced to offer the private shares on deal terms favorable to the private
investors to the detriment of current shareholders.101
The redemption right provides an appealing option for investors.
Indeed, given the uncertainties inherent in a SPAC venture, the redemption
option is almost a necessity as investors are investing based on their
confidence in the Promoters’ ability to research, select, and acquire a suitable
Target. At the time the investors make their initial investment, however,
they have no idea who the ultimate Target Company may be.102 It can be
argued that the redemption right is the feature that gives investors the
comfort to move forward with a SPAC investment in the first place. But the
redemption right can also make consummating a business combination a
challenge at times, because each dollar redeemed is one less dollar the SPAC
100. See Acquicor, supra note 75, at 4 (“Public stockholders voting against a business
combination will be entitled to convert their stock into a pro rata share of the trust account.”).
101. See Klausner et al., supra note 75, at 38 (discussing PIPES).
102. Id. at 10.
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can use to consummate a business combination.
I.

SPACs Typically Require Shareholder Vote

SPACs will set up its governance structure such that approval from the
publicly held shares is required before the SPAC will move forward with a
proposed business combination.103 Generally the vote that is required is
majority approval.104 The majority approval requirement falls in line with
most state corporate law codes which generally require shareholder approval
for “fundamental corporate changes” – acquiring a company or merging with
a company would be considered a “fundament corporate change.” Again,
the voting requirement is one that gives the shareholders some say and some
control over the process. Likewise, the voting requirement gives
shareholders the voting power to scuttle a proposed business combination,
even in those instances where the Target may be a perfectly suitable one.
J. SPACs and Their Hidden Costs
SPAC critics have dissected the SPAC structure and have cited several
ways in which the SPAC deal structure ends up costing the investors. These
shareholder costs are subtle and are not apparent until the investor is no
longer in a position to act or react.
The first and perhaps the most significant cost to shareholders is the
exorbitant fee that the public shareholders pay to the SPAC Promoters. It’s
not apparent why the investors don’t push back on this. Perhaps the investors
see the SPAC promote as a cost of doing business. Some have argued that
the ultimate compensation or return on investment that the Promoters end up
receiving far outweighs the effort the promoter’s put into researching,
selecting, and ultimately acquiring a Target.105
As discussed earlier, the Promoter’s essentially make their money on a
SPAC transaction based on the extremely low price that the promoter’s pay
for their shares. For example, with Acquicor Technology, Inc., the Acquicor
Promoters paid $.004 per share, paying a total of $25,000 for which the
Acquicor Promoters acquired 6,250,000 Acquicor Technology, Inc. shares.
In contrast, the public shareholders paid $6 per share for each of the 25
103. See, e.g., Acquicor, supra note 75, at 4 (requiring shareholder approval for an initial
business combination).
104. See, e.g., Acquicor, supra note 75, at 4.
105. Matt Levine, SPACs Aren’t Cheaper Than IPOs Yet, BLOOMBERG (July 27, 2020,
10:59 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-07-27/spacs-aren-t-cheaperthan-ipos-yet [https://perma.cc/JQG4-MDEP].
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million shares issued to them. Exhibit 3106 illustrates dilution in the shares
issued, percentage ownership, consideration paid, and the price paid per
share:
Exhibit 3

Summary of Acquicor’s Dilution to New Investors107
As Exhibit 3 illustrates, the Promoters are contributing .02% of actual
cash consideration but receiving 20% of the SPAC’s equity.108 The disparity
is evident. The apparent argument from the promoter’s standpoint is that
they are earning their 20% equity stake through “sweat equity” in lieu of cash
consideration. Establishing the SPAC, time and effort spent finding a
suitable Target, the “due diligence” time involved, vetting a suitable Target
and consummating the business combination. Their argument is that these
value-added efforts is what warrants their share allotment for virtually no
cash consideration. The question becomes whether the Promoter’s
involvement in the deal equates to $37,475,000?109 (i.e., the additional
consideration the Promoters would pay if their purchase price were equal to
the price the public shareholders paid).
Accordingly, the large price disparity between the cash consideration
that the promoter’s paid and the cash consideration that the public
shareholders paid creates a dilutive effect for the public shareholders at the
outset and lowers the public shareholder’s book value per share immediately.
K. The SPAC Redemption Feature
The deal structure component that ultimately ends up costing a subset
of public shareholders is the redemption right that SPACs grant to the public
shareholder.110 The redemption right grants any public shareholder the right
106. Acquicor, supra note 75, at 28.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Simply the difference between the $.004 per share that the promoters actually paid
and the $6 per share that the public shareholders paid.
110. See Acquicor, supra note 75, at 4 (SPACs may refer to this as a conversion right.
Either way, the mechanics are the same).
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to redeem his SPAC shares up until a point just prior to a pending business
combination.111 The public shareholder’s right to redeem the shares is
triggered in the event the shareholder votes against a business combination.
Presumably, the SPAC affords the redemption right to induce shareholder
investment in a speculative venture where the investor has no idea whether
the SPAC will select a Target Company that will add shareholder value or
will ultimately be a bust. At the time the SPAC conducts the IPO, there is
no Target Company in play and therefore no way to value the shareholder’s
investment.
At that point, the investment is in the shareholders’ faith in the
Promoters’ ability to find, select, and merge with a suitable Target company.
But for the redemption right that gives the public shareholder a risk-free exit
from the venture at the shareholders’ calling, SPAC investing may be
deemed too risky to be viable. Thus, the redemption right gives the
shareholder the necessary contingency plan that allows him to move forward
with making the initial investment in the SPAC in the absence of having any
real sense of the investment’s ultimate value proposition.
Professors Klausner, Ohlrogge, and Ruan show that SPAC shareholders
on average redeem their shares at an average rate of 73%.112 The way most
SPAC redemptions work is that the SPAC shareholder is entitled to the
shareholders’ pro-rata share of the net proceeds then remaining in the trust
net of any taxes that might be payable. As mentioned earlier, the IPO
proceeds are held in a trust account pending the SPAC finding and merging
with a suitable Target company. The trust account in which the proceeds are
held is often an interest-bearing account that yields a modest yet solid return.
Thus, many of the initial shareholders opt to redeem their shares prior to any
business combination and therefore have no stake or involvement if and
when the SPAC ultimately merges with a selected Target.
Consequently, the redemption right afforded to the public shareholders
often creates significant challenges for the SPAC Promoters while at the
same time diminishes the value proposition for those shareholders who
choose not to redeem their shares. When SPAC shareholders exercise their
redemption rights, each redemption depletes the capital held in the trust. The
more shares redeemed, the less capital available to be used in a potential
business combination. The SPAC promoter, in turn, will take several
measures to counteract the capital being depleted in the Trust.
First and most significant, the SPAC Promoters may seek to raise
additional capital to offset the capital being depleted through redemptions.113
111. See Acquicor, supra note 75, at 4.
112. Klausner et al., supra note 57, at 14.
113. See Acquicor, supra note 75, at 8.
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The SPAC Promoters will accomplish this through one or more private
offerings. Private offerings in this context are referred to as “PIPES” –
Private Investment in Public Entities. The SPAC will issue unregistered
shares to private investors through these PIPE transactions. Appreciate the
context in which these PIPE transactions are occurring. The SPAC’s Trust
Account has been depleted due to significant redemptions. If the SPAC is
well into the 24–month window, then the SPAC is in a time pressured
situation where the SPAC may have to liquidate the Trust and return ALL
the proceeds to the shareholders if the SPAC fails to acquire a Target within
the allotted eighteen to twenty–four month window. In this event the SPAC
Promoters stand to lose out on the returns they would have realized from
acquiring a stake in an actual entity for which they paid a nominal amount in
actual cash consideration.
These “pressure points” on the venture gives the private placement
investors leverage in the transaction which enables them to purchase the
additional shares on favorable terms; likely at a price per share significantly
less than what the public shareholders paid in the initial IPO. The lowered
price is necessary to make the investment palatable to the private investors.
The value proposition for the private shareholders is much more speculative
as they likely will not have the same redemption rights that were afforded to
the public shareholders. At the juncture where private investors come into
the picture, a Target Company may presently be in play and under
consideration. Thus, the private investor is not investing blindly as was the
case with the public investors. But the venture is still a speculative one
depending on the ultimate Target and that Target’s prospects for success
going forward as the entity that has merged with the SPAC. Thus, all these
unknowns will be baked into the share price the private investors pay and
will likely be at a share price that is less than what the public shareholders
paid.
Likewise, as was the case with the nominal share price for which the
SPAC issued shares to the Promoters, selling the shares at a cheaper price to
the private investors also has a dilutive effect on the shares, as the initial
shareholders will now own a smaller percentage of the company with each
share issued in the private placement.11" Each share sold to private investors
at the lower price, dilutes the share value for those that acquired shares in the
IPO.

114. Id. at 10 (discussing the dilutive effects of additional issuances of common stock).
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L. The Underwriting Fee – Another Hidden Cost
The underwriting fee is also a hidden cost to SPAC shareholders that
isn’t readily apparent. Advocates for the SPAC structure in comparison to
the IPO cite, among other things, that the underwriting fees charged in SPAC
transactions are less expensive than the underwriting fees charged in IPOs.
At initial glance this is true. The underwriting fee for traditional IPOs is
around 5-7% of net proceeds, whereas in the SPAC deals, the underwriting
fee is typically 5.5%.115 In real costs, however, the underwriting fee for
SPACs typically end up being a greater percentage of net proceeds. Again,
this is due to the SPAC’s redemption feature. For each SPAC shareholder
that redeems its shares, the underwriting fee then is a greater percentage in
terms of net proceeds.116 As discussed earlier, on average, 73 percent of net
proceeds are redeemed by the SPAC shareholders thereby raising the actual
underwriting fee as a percentage of net proceeds.117 The apparent price
advantage that SPACs provide generally ends up not being the case once the
redemptions are accounted for.
M. Are SPACS a Valued Added Proposition?
Whether SPACs are a value-added proposition for those that invest, of
course, depends on several variables. Each will have bearing on whether
investing in a SPAC proves to be a value-added proposition. The first factor
depends on the capacity in which the shareholder is investing. Promoter,
public shareholder, or private placement investor. The investor’s capacity
and how they manage that investment vis-à-vis the SPAC will have a large
bearing on the investor’s ultimate return.
SPAC Promoters have the greatest potential for return. This is so
because their upfront cash consideration is minimal.118 Therefore, it doesn’t
take much in terms of upside for the promoter to realize a positive return. If
the SPAC ultimately finds a suitable Target and the transaction is
consummated, a positive return for the SPAC Promoters is virtually assured
even if the economics of the business combination are modest. Recall in the
Acquicor Technology SPAC, the Promoters paid $.004 per share.119 Thus,
$.004 per share is the benchmark for the Promoters. Any returns that exceed
115. See Klausner et al., supra note 57, at 6.
116. Id. at 27–28.
117. Id. at 14.
118. See Acquicor, supra note 75, at 28 (indicating an average price per share of $0.004
for SPAC promoters).
119. See Acquicor, supra note 75, at 28.
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this nominal upfront payment amount to a positive return on investment for
the SPAC Promoters.120
N. Value Proposition for Public Shareholders
For the SPACs’ public shareholders, the value proposition is less
certain, and the ultimate return depends how public shareholders decide to
navigate their investment. As discussed earlier, when the public shareholder
votes against a proposed business combination, the redemption right is
triggered for the SPAC public shareholder.121 If the public shareholder
decides on that option then it will be entitled to its pro rata share of the
proceeds remaining in the Trust Account at the time it exercises its option to
redeem.122 But recall, the SPAC will already have taken a portion out for
operating expenses to cover costs incurred for that eighteen to twenty-four
month window in which the SPAC is seeking a suitable Target.123
Additionally, as discussed earlier, the SPAC public shares also come
with warrants. Generally, the warrant holder will be able to exercise the
warrant following the SPAC’s successful completion of a business
combination. Per the SPAC terms, the public shareholder does not redeem
the warrants but merely the common shares. Thus, if a business combination
is consummated, the public shareholder can still exercise the warrants even
if the shareholder has already redeemed its common shares.
Accordingly, depending on the depletion in the trust account, and the
economics of the business combination, those variables will have a bearing
on the public shareholder’s ultimate return on its investment. With the
warrants in play, the public shareholder gets two bites at the apple. The first
would be through a redemption. And the second would be through the
exercise of the warrants that the shareholder was able to keep even after
redeeming its shares.
Public shareholders also have the option of selling the SPAC shares on
the open market, as these are publicly traded shares. Again, given the unique
deal structure for SPACs, and that there may be no Target Company in play
when the public shareholder seeks to sell its shares, it is doubtful whether the
120. It is acknowledged that there are opportunity costs associated with the time the
Promoters spend on searching, selecting, and ultimately acquiring a Target Company.
Quantifying that time, though considerable, would be speculative. Though it does raise the
question of whether that time spent is equivalent to the cash consideration that the public
shareholders pay for their shares.
121. See Acquicor, supra note 75, at 4 (“Public stockholders voting against a business
combination will be entitled to convert their stock into a pro rate share of the trust account.”).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 24.
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SPAC shareholder will be able to command a price much higher than the
initial IPO price.
Finally, the public shareholder could hang on to its shares until the
consummation of the SPAC completing a business combination. The public
shareholder’s value would then be a function of the acquired Target’s value.
Again – recognizing that by the time the SPAC gets around to consummating
a business combination, the initial public shareholder’s stake in the venture
has been diluted through 1) the twenty percent promoter’s equity stake in the
business that was acquired for nominal cash consideration; 2) any public
shareholders exercising their redemption options; and 3) the ultimate offset
in the depleted Trust through the SPAC raising additional capital by issuing
additional shares in a private placement and doing so at terms more favorable
than the price the initial public shareholders paid in the public offering.
Where SPACs have been touted as more appealing investments than
traditional IPOs due to some certainties such as the redemption right and the
right to vote on whether to move forward with a proposed business
combination, the SPAC, upon further examination, has several variables,
which makes its value proposition less clear. There is a return to be realized
on SPAC investments, but much has to do with timing and buy-sell decisions
where such decisions are made prior to acquiring an actual Target; the whole
reason for the SPAC in the first place.
O. The Decision to Withdraw the IPO
In their study covering the period 2003-2019 of 370 SPACs intending
to IPO, professors Dimic, Lawrence, and Vulanovic find that, “both
prospectuses’ characteristics and market characteristics determine
choices of withdrawal.”124 They note that “[t]he likelihood of withdrawals
is in direct relation with the level of volatility on the day of IPO/withdrawal
and if the acquisition target is in the private equity domain.”125 In addition:
SPACs are less likely to withdraw their IPO if they have a clear
focus of acquisition, have a larger number of underwriters in the syndicate,
and if their legal counsel is specialized in the SPAC market. We also
document that the speed of IPO for SPACs is directly related
to the level of the market, size of IPO, and if the CEO was previously
manager of other public companies. On the other side, IPO takes longer if

124. Nebojsa Dimic, Edward R. Lawrence & Milos Vulanovic, THE DETERMINANTS OF
IPO WITHDRAWALS: EVIDENCE FROM SPACS (2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3538671
[https://perma.cc/T9YZ-FA9H].
125. Id.
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two lead underwriters underwrite the SPAC.126

IV.

FINANCIAL REPORTING AND AUDITING
CONSIDERATIONS

A. SPAC Financial Reporting
The rules that apply for disclosures generally in the Initial Public
Offering context likewise apply for SPACS.127 Issuers must disclose all
“material” financial and business information pertaining to the company.
Granted, the shell company that formed the SPAC will not have any material
operations per se as the company at that point is merely a shell, with no
operations to report.128 Thus, the financial statements in the SPAC’s initial
offering document will be modest at best. The balance sheet will reflect the
shares issued to the Promoters and the nominal consideration paid.129
Additionally, the SPAC may borrow a sum of money to use as working
capital to get things in place.130 In the Acquicor Technology offering
document, Acquicor Management LLC, the company’s sole shareholder
prior to the offering, loaned the SPAC $275,000 which was reflected as a
“[n]ote payable to a stockholder” on the SPAC’s balance sheet.131 Likewise,
the Statement of Operations and the Statement of Cash Flows will reflect
these nominal activities to date. The Statement of Operations will reflect any
nominal expenses that have been incurred up until that point. Likewise, the
Statement of Cash Flows will show the cash infusion from the note payable,
as well as the nominal consideration that the Promoters paid in cash for the
twenty percent equity stake they acquired in the SPAC.132 Thus, at the
126. Id.
127. SPAC Offerings and IPOs are both Initial Public Offerings. SPAC Offerings are
different in the fact that with the SPAC there is no actual company that is offering shares –
merely a Shell company that is formed to acquire a target company. But both are subject to
the exact same disclosure regime commensurate with an S-1 Registration Statement and the
corresponding Regulation S-K and S-X.
128. See Acquicor, supra note 75, at 1 (“To date, our activities have been limited to
organizational activities.”).
129. See Acquicor, supra note 75, at F-3.
130. Id.
131. See Acquicor, supra note 75.
132. Id. at F-6 (providing Acquicor’s statement of cash flows).

672

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 24:3

outset, financial reporting for the SPAC is minimal and won’t be of much
assistance to the reader of the SPAC’s initial offering document.
But when the SPAC eventually locates and selects its Target, then of
course, all the Target’s material financial and business operations must be
disclosed going forward.
Regarding the SPAC itself and the SPAC’s operation before acquiring
the Target - given the SPAC’s nature, the relationship between the promoters
and the public shareholders, the allowance for redeeming shares, and the
possibility of additional funding that may be required - there are key pieces
of information regarding the dynamics between these parties that should be
disclosed in the SPAC’s initial offering document.
B. The SPAC Promoters and Their Potential Conflicts
Regarding the SPAC Promoters, what should be made very clear in the
offering document is all the ways in which the interests between the
Promoters and the shareholders may not align and in many instances may be
in direct conflict. These conflicts of interest and misaligned incentives are
attributed to the SPACs unique deal structure, its timelines, and the way the
Promoters profit from SPAC ventures. Shareholders should be made aware
of these conflicts.133
C. The Two-Year Window for Selecting and Acquiring a Target
Unique to the SPAC deal structure, the SPAC essentially has twentyfour months to select and acquire a Target Company.134 If the SPAC fails to
do so, the SPAC is required to return all unused proceeds from its offering
back to shareholders.135 Depending on how the SPAC transaction is
structured, if the Promoters fail to identify and acquire a suitable Target
within the allotted time, then the Promoters stand to lose out on millions.
The offering document should explain the deal terms and should explain the
financial consequences to the Promoters in the event the Promoters fail to
find a suitable Target within the allotted time. Depending on how those
compensation and investment terms are structured, the Promoters could be
133. Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 22, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/disclosure-special-purpose-acquisition-companies
[https://perma.cc/3SGR-7C45].
134. See Acquicor, supra note 75, at 5. Usually, the SPAC deal documents allow up to
eighteen months to enter into a Letter of Intent with a Target and then up to twenty-four
months to complete the business combination.
135. Id.
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incentivized to make decisions that are in the Promoter’s best interest but
may be to the detriment of the SPACs public shareholders. Consider the
scenario where the twenty-four-month window is winding down and the
Promoters have failed to acquire or even identify a suitable Target. In that
event, the SPAC would be forced to liquidate the remaining proceeds held
in the Trust and return those proceeds back to the Shareholders. Under that
scenario, faced with the prospect of losing out on investment and
compensation returns incorporated into the deal structure, the Promoter’s
otherwise sound decision making may become compromised. In lieu of no
Target being acquired, the Promoters may select a less than suitable Target
or may select a Target under inferior deal terms i.e., paying an inflated value
for a Target as the Target uses the SPAC’s closing twenty-four-month
window as leverage to negotiate a deal that is advantageous to the Target but
less so to the SPAC.
D. Proper Disclosure of Target Selection
Many SPAC Promoters are specialists in a certain industry or business
sector.136 Their particular SPAC may have been formed to target a business
or businesses within that sector. Accordingly, it is foreseeable that the
Promoters may select a Target where one or more of the Promoters may be
affiliated with that selected Target. In this event, the offering document
should disclose both the nature of those affiliations, how that affiliation poses
actual or perceived conflicts of interest, and, most importantly, how the
SPAC intends to manage those conflicts so that Shareholders are aware of
how those conflicts may adversely affect their investment in the SPAC.137
E. Altering the SPAC Terms
When a SPAC seeks to acquire or merge with a target, these can be fluid
situations which may require adjustments to the deal terms or deal structure
to make the transaction work. The need for fluidity becomes even more
acute in the context of a SPAC transaction where timelines for
consummating a deal are finite and where the capital available to complete
the deal is the sum offering amount raised in the IPO which will dwindle
over time due to the costs incurred to find, select, and consummate a business
combination with a selected Target. Accordingly, the need for flexibility can
often be structured into the SPAC schematic and will be outlined in the

136. Id. at 45 (describing the backgrounds of Acquicor’s directors and executive officers).
137. Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, supra note 133.
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SPACs governing documents. From a disclosure standpoint, the Promoter’s
ability to alter the SPACs deal structure should be disclosed in the offering
document. For instance, if the SPAC Promoters have the authority to extend
the twenty-four-month window under certain circumstances in order to
consummate a merger, the triggering event for the extension should be
disclosed.
Another key element in the SPAC structure is the SPAC’s ability to
raise additional capital when necessary. Recall, that most SPACs have the
redemption feature where shareholders who received shares in the IPO have
the option to redeem their shares at times prior to the SPAC’s merger with a
selected Target. This redemption option can leave the SPAC in a position
where it may need to acquire more capital to consummate the merger. The
SPAC Promoters may address this in several ways. The Promoters may
infuse the additional capital themselves; they may enter into some type of
“side” agreement with the current shareholders and incentivize them NOT to
redeem their shares. The SPAC Promoters may also seek additional capital
from private investors through a PIPE. These different contingencies will
affect the public shareholders in different ways. For example, consider the
dilutive effect on the SPAC’s public shareholders of offering shares in the
private placement. Often, to induce the private investors, the SPAC
Promoter may have to “sweeten” the deal. The valuation on which the
private investors purchase their shares may be lower than the typical $10
price per share that the public shareholders paid.138 If the SPAC governing
documents make allowances for any of these contingencies, then the SPAC
should disclose these contingencies, and to the extent possible, the SPAC
should make attempts to quantify how each of the contingencies may affect
the value of the public SPAC shareholder’s shares.
F. The SPAC Promoters and their Previous Experience
SPAC Promoter expertise, knowledge and experience can vary greatly.
These attributes may likely prove highly correlated to the ultimate success
of any given SPAC. Accordingly, pointed, factual disclosure regarding the
management team comprising the SPAC Promoters should be included in
the offering document in sufficient detail. Numerous examples of
experienced SPAC promoters and examples of their success are noted versus
more novice sponsors. For example, some of the largest transactions to be
brought include: that by Brad Gerstner, founder of Altimeter Capital

138. Often the price per share for SPAC IPOs are set at between $6 and $10 per share
(more recently, most are at $10).

2022]

SPECIAL PURPOSE ACQUISITION

675

Management, who “reached a $40 billion SPAC deal for app operator Grab
Holdings Inc. in April” 2021;139 ten companies in the space industry have
successfully announced or raised funds via SPACS;140 Idealab incubator
entrepreneur Bill Gross’s sponsorship of solar-power firm Heliogen.141
However, some high visibility announced transactions simply don’t close-such as the $40 dollar valuation of Universal Music by Bill Ackman.142
G. The SPACs Target Selection Process
The overall success of a SPAC transaction will be determined by the
Target Company the SPAC acquires and the price paid for it. Accordingly,
material disclosures will involve explaining the process the SPAC intends to
engage to select a suitable Target. Once a Target is selected, the SPAC
should disclose the thought process involved with concluding that the
selected Target Company was the best and most suitable choice.
Additionally, the SPAC should reveal all the material merger terms including
any conflicts of interest between the selected Target and the SPAC
Promoters, officers, and directors.
Ideally, prior to the SPAC’s formation and commencing the IPO, it is
hoped and expected that the SPAC Promoters have an approach in mind as
to their planned process for selecting a Target. Indeed, the Target Company
selection process is a disclosure mine field for the SPAC. It is reasonable to
deduce that in some SPAC formations, the Promoters may already have a
Target Company in mind prior to forming the SPAC. There is no prohibition
against this per se. But, if it becomes evident that the SPAC did have a
Target Company already in mind prior to forming the SPAC, then the
disclosure rules mandate that the SPAC disclose in its IPO offering
document that the SPAC has one or more Target companies already under
consideration.
139. Juliet Chung & Amrith Ramkumar, As SPAC Creators Get Rich, How Incentives Are
Shared Remains Murky, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2021, 3:50 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-spac-creators-get-rich-how-incentives-are-shared-remainsmurky-11627995686 [https://perma.cc/8XUA-32K9].
140. Erin Woo, Start-Ups on the Launching Pad, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/07/technology/space-start-ups.html
[https://perma.cc/7FN7-K6V6].
141. Amrith Ramkumar, Solar-Power Firm Heliogen Plans to Merge With SPAC, WALL
ST. J. (July 6, 2021, 3:50 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/concentrated-solar-power-firmheliogen-to-go-public-in-2-billion-spac-merger-11625607000
[https://perma.cc/P9ZU82S5].
142. Michael J. de la Merced, Bill Ackman Drops SPAC Deal with Universal Music, N.Y.
TIMES (July 19, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/19/business/bill-ackmanuniversal-music.html [https://perma.cc/59CT-VC49].
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Once the SPAC does select a Target Company, then disclosing how the
SPAC arrived at its decision would be appropriate through material
disclosure. Appreciate that the SPAC Promoters may be leveraging their
relationships and connections in that business sector or industry to broker a
deal. Additionally, as alluded to earlier, the SPAC Promoters, directors, or
officers may have some type of affiliation with the selected Target. That
affiliation could be as a major shareholder, an officer, or director. In any
event, the SPAC should likewise be disclosing all relationships that fall into
this category. Finally, if the relationship is such that it is or could conflict
with the Shareholder’s interests, the SPAC should be disclosing with clarity
what those conflicts are and the potential adverse effects those conflicts
could have on the public shares.
In sum, regarding financial disclosures, the SPAC structure creates a
unique relationship between the SPAC’s public shareholders and the SPAC’s
Promoters, directors, and officers. At times, the SPAC’s incentive structure
can create situations where SPAC Promoter’s incentives may not align or
may even conflict with the SPAC’s public shareholders. The offering
document needs to make these incentives and any potential conflicts clear
and apparent. The offering document also needs to make clear the situations
or the potential contingencies in which these conflicts might occur. Hiding
the ball in this regard exposes the SPAC to Section 11 violations.
H. Internal Control Considerations
The Federal Securities laws have specific requirements that relate to
publicly traded companies regarding their internal controls over financial
reporting (ICFR).143 In short, public companies are generally required to
maintain internal control over financial reporting and disclosure controls and
procedures (DCP).144
These requirements hold for all publicly traded
companies and are not unique to SPAC acquired Target companies. But
what is unique and what can be a challenge for SPAC acquired Targets are
the abbreviated timelines.145 The Target has to appreciate that financial
accounting and internal control protocols may have to be revamped on a
143. See § 404 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Management Assessment of Internal Controls, Pub.
L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (discussing required internal controls over financial
reporting in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
144. Financial Reporting and Auditing Considerations of Companies Merging with
SPACS, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N (Mar. 31, 2021), www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/munterspac-20200331 [https://perma.cc/CJY9-58KC] [hereinafter Financial Reporting and Auditing
Considerations] (discussing internal controls, specifically for companies that merge with
SPACs).
145. Id.
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short timeline to comply with federal securities laws. Specific internal
control compliance requirements are triggered once the Target Company
becomes publicly traded. The Target company’s internal control protocols,
if it hasn’t happened already, will have to be revamped to comply with
provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.146
I.

Auditor Considerations

Auditor considerations are not unique to SPAC transactions. These
requirements pertain to all publicly traded companies. But again, the need
to get things in place quickly with the SPAC structure’s abbreviated
timelines are what’s at issue here. All publicly traded companies must
adhere to periodic reporting requirements which, among other things,
requires audited annual financial statements. Additionally, the audits must
be performed in compliance with the requirements established by the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).147 Additionally, the audit
must be performed by an accounting firm that meets both PCAOB and
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) independence requirements.148
Key components to these requirements are 1) the firm performing the
financial audits for the Target Company cannot be serving in the dual
capacity as consultant or advisor to that Target company. Whether actual or
perceived, the Commission felt that serving in the dual capacities
compromises the auditor’s independence; and 2) that the firm be independent
from the stand point that the accounting firm is not auditing its own work.149
In other words, to the extent that that accounting firm is auditing financial
statements that it previously may have had a hand in preparing, such a
relationship would run contrary to the PCAOB’s and the SEC’s auditor
independence guidelines. Again, these independence requirements are not
unique to SPAC acquired companies. However, issues like having a Target
companies’ financial statements audited by a properly qualified accounting
firm and making sure financial reporting and disclosure deadlines are
adhered to and are completed timely are unique. Both the SPACs corporate
governance teams as well as the Target Companies’ management teams must
coordinate well and must stay on top of these issues. If not handled properly,
these snafus could cause a de-SPAC transaction to be delayed, or the deal
could get scuttled altogether. Thus, staying on top of these infrastructure
146.
143.
147.
148.
149.

§ 404 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Management Assessment of Internal Controls, supra note
Financial Reporting and Auditing Considerations, supra note 144.
Id.
Id.
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issues are of primary importance to smoothly completing the SPACs merger
with the Target and then seamless operation post-merger.
J. Corporate Governance
Knowledgeable officers and directors are paramount to a successful
SPAC acquisition and post-merger operation.150 From the SPACs standpoint – the ideal situation is one where the SPAC management team has prior
knowledge and expertise on both executing a SPAC’s acquisition of a Target,
and being knowledgeable about all the corporate governance requirements
commensurate with a SPAC acquisition that will result in a near overnight
transition from being privately held to being publicly traded. Such a
transformation can be a shock to the Target company’s system. The Target
Company officers and directors may lack public company governance
experience and may have a steep learning curve to climb and a short span of
time in which to get up to speed.151 Seasoned corporate directors are
absolutely required and will need to be recruited if not already onboard.152
Thus, we underscore the importance of the SPAC management team being
150. See Lawrence J. Trautman, The Matrix: The Board’s Responsibility for Director
Selection and Recruitment, 11 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 75 (2012),
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1998489 [https://perma.cc/Q34A-6US9] (discussing the
paramount importance of selecting knowledgeable directors and officers); Lawrence J.
Trautman, Seletha Butler, Frederick Chang, Michele Hooper, Ron McCray & Ruth Simmons,
Corporate Directors: Who They Are, What They Do, Cyber and Other Contemporary
Challenges, 70 BUFF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3792382
[https://perma.cc/ZLP6-J7YL] (discussing the roles of corporate directors and their
challenges).
151. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, Will Corporations Deliver Value to All
Stakeholders?,
75
VAND.
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
May
2022),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3899421 [https://perma.cc/LD3H-6NGB] (discussing balancing
stakeholders concerns and creating value for all stakeholders); Lawrence J. Trautman, Who
Qualifies as an Audit Committee Financial Expert Under SEC Regulations and NYSE Rules?,
11 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 205 (2013), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2137747
[https://perma.cc/G54P-RTFC] (discussing who qualifies as an audit committee financial
expert).
152. See Lawrence J. Trautman, Present at the Creation: Reflections on the Early Years
of the National Association of Corporate Directors, 17 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 1 (2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2296427 [https://perma.cc/6JTB-5XC3] (discussing earlier issues
and goals of corporate directors to be used as a source of continuing director education);
Lawrence J. Trautman, Who Sits on Texas Corporate Boards? Texas Corporate Directors:
Who They Are and What They Do, 16 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 44 (2016),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2493569 [https://perma.cc/7FY3-UP6P] (discussing who Texan
board directors are); Lawrence J. Trautman, The Board’s Responsibility for Crisis
Governance, 13 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 275 (2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2623219
[https://perma.cc/AP9H-8FCL] (discussing a board’s responsibilities for crisis governance).

2022]

SPECIAL PURPOSE ACQUISITION

679

knowledgeable about what governance issues need to be addressed and
when.153 Target company management may lack prior experience with
issues important to the SEC, institutional investors, and the disclosure
process such as ESG,154 diversity,155 and cybersecurity protection.156
153. See John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Essential Elements
of Corporate Law (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 134, 2009),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1436551 [https://perma.cc/U4FD-AVP3] (discussing agency issues
that arise in corporate governance); Stephen Mark Bainbridge, Director Primacy and
Shareholder
Disempowerment,
119
HARV.
L.
REV.
119,
(2006),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=808584 [https://perma.cc/DK77-QRUX] (discussing the conflicts
between director powers over the shareholder); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen
Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783 (2009),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=593423 [https://perma.cc/S8VB-EBEA] (discussing what matters
in corporate governance); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance:
Overview of the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647 (2005), https://ssrn.com/abstract=761970v
[https://perma.cc/RHG6-8PX2] (discussing director compensation); see also Lawrence D.
Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation, 25 J. ACCT. & PUB.
POL’Y 409, (2006), https://ssrn.com/abstract=754484 [https://perma.cc/PRX4-6F77]
(discussing corporate governances role on corporate valuation); Brian R. Cheffins, The
History of Corporate Governance, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON CORP. GOVERNANCE, Mike
Wright, Donald Siegel, Kevin Keasey and Igor Filatotchev, eds., (Oxford U. Press, 2013),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1975404 [https://perma.cc/4BN9-GHGQ] (reviewing the history of
corporate governance); John C. Coffee, A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the U.S. And
Europe Differ (Ctr. for L. & Econ. Stud., Working Paper No. 274, 2005),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=694581 [https://perma.cc/X8JC-3CSD] (discussing how the
differences between U.S. corporations and European corporations create differences in
scandals); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systematic Stewardship, (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working
Paper No. 566, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782814 [https://perma.cc/B3LW-KERB]
(framing stewardship engagement by large institutional investors); Michael Jensen, Agency
Costs of Overvalued Equity (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 39, 2004),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=480421
[https://perma.cc/Q7BWNU6T] (discussing agency costs’ effect on firms); Donald C. Langevoort & Hillary A. Sale,
CORPORATE
ADOLESCENCE:
WHY
DID
‘WE’
NOT
WORK?
(2021),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3762718 [https://perma.cc/Y3QX-BAU6] (discussing fiduciary
deficits in U.S. firms); Veronica Root Martinez & Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Equality Metrics,
130
YALE
L.J.
FORUM
169
(2021),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3772895
[https://perma.cc/HY6S-36AT] (discussing corporate involvement in the Black Lives Matter
Movement and tackling issues of race in corporations).
154. Lawrence J. Trautman & Neal Newman, The ESG Debate Emerges from the Soil of
Climate Denial (Oct. 10, 2021) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3939898
[https://perma.cc/KVW9-N9ZD].
155. See Lawrence J. Trautman, Corporate Boardroom Diversity: Why Are We Still
Talking About This?, 17 The SCHOLAR 219 (2015), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2047750
[https://perma.cc/V6VR-A9ZX] (discussing diversity).
156. Lawrence. J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, Corporate Directors’ and Officers’
Cybersecurity Standard of Care: The Yahoo Data Breach, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1231 (2017),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2883607 [https://perma.cc/9APY-J3P]; H. Justin Pace & Lawrence
J. Trautman, Mission Critical: Caremark, Blue Bell, and Director Responsibility for
Cybersecurity
Governance,
2022
Wis.
L.
Rev.
(forthcoming)
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Recently, Professors Klausner and Ohlrogge write, “SPACs must
address an inherent conflict between the interests of a SPAC sponsor and its
public shareholders in entering into a merger.”157 Consider:
The economic structure of a SPAC creates an inherent conflict
between a sponsor and the SPAC’s public shareholders. The
conflict arises in two related ways. First, if the SPAC does not
merge, it must liquidate, in which case the sponsor gets nothing,
and the cash the SPAC holds in trust is paid out to the public
shareholders. If the best merger a sponsor can find will be worth
less than the $10 liquidation price to public shareholders, the
shareholders will prefer a liquidation, but the sponsor will favor
the value-decreasing merger. Second, when a SPAC board
proposes a merger, the public shareholders have the first claim to
the cash in the trust. They retrieve that cash by exercising their
redemption right. The SPAC has a claim only to the cash
remaining in the trust after shareholder redemptions, which is then
used to fund the merger. If the amount of post-redemption cash in
the trust is below the minimum required by the SPAC’s merger
agreement, the target may terminate the agreement, in which case
the SPAC will liquidate unless it finds another merger opportunity
before its time runs out. Furthermore, the more cash that remains
available to fund the merger, the more valuable the post-merger
company will be for the sponsor. A sponsor, therefore, not only
has an incentive to merge when doing so is not in the public
shareholders’ interest, it also has an incentive to dissuade the
public shareholders from redeeming their shares.158
Professors Klausner and Ohlrogge recognize that “The central
governance challenge of a SPAC is to manage the inherent conflict between
the sponsor and the public shareholders.”159 Post-IPO funding:
[T]he SPAC’s sponsor and management search for a merger
candidate. The shareholders are hopeful for a merger that will
result in the appreciation of their shares above their redemption or
liquidation price of about $10, but if no such opportunity is
available, the shareholders will want their money back, either
through the exercise of their redemption right when the board
proposes a merger, or through a liquidation set in motion by the
http://ssrn.com/abstract=3938128 [https://perma.cc/XS4K-LKT3].
157. Michael Klausner & Michael Ohlrogge, SPAC Governance: In Need of Judicial
Review 3 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. L. L. & Econ. Rsch. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 22-07,
2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3967693
[https://perma.cc/NSS7-X5TM].
158. Id. at 5–6.
159. Id. at 6.
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board. The sponsor also would like a value-increasing merger, if
it can find one.160
And now we come to the heart of the inherent conflict between the
public shareholders and the SPAC sponsor. As Klausner and Ohlrogge
explain, if the sponsor is unsuccessful in locating “a target with which it can
negotiate a good deal, the sponsor’s incentive is to take a bad deal rather than
liquidate. The sponsor gets nothing in a liquidation; its shares do not
participate in the distribution of cash.”161 In sum:
This is the key governance challenge for SPACS. In a liquidation,
the sponsor gets nothing and loses its initial investment. Even in
a merger that is a worse deal for public shareholders than a
liquidation, the 20% equity interest that the sponsor received
essentially for free will typically be worth many millions of
dollars.162

V.

TOPPS CO. ATTEMPTS GOING PUBLIC VIA SPAC

During early April 2021, Mudrick Capital Acquisition Corp. II,
announces its intention to merge with baseball-card manufacturer Topps Co.
in a SPAC transaction valuing Topps at about $1.16 billion.163 Purchased
during 2007 by the private-equity firm Madison Dearborn Partners for $385
million, this transition received unusual notice due, in part, to involvement
by the former Walt Disney chairman and CEO Michael Eisner, who remains
chairman of Topps post-merger.164
Professors Rodrigues and Stegemoller highlight SPAC harms that may
present corporate governance issues; “First, they are singularly illiquid
investments—even when nominally public, SPACs are generally owned and
traded by the very few. Second, SPACs evolved to eliminate meaningful
shareholder voice on the acquisition of a private target, using instead a
species of ‘empty voting,’ [where] . . . such vote had no economic
impact.”165 Rodrigues and Stegemoller contend, “By rendering the
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Dave Sebastian, SPAC Sees Digital Trophy in Topps, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2021, at
B1.
164. Id.
165. Usha Rodrigues & Michael Stegemoller, SPACs: Insider IPOs 1 (Univ. Ga. Sch. L.
Roch.
Paper
Series,
Working
Paper
No.
2021-09,
2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3906196
[https://perma.cc/4G7C-
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shareholder vote a nullity, SPACs can now virtually guarantee that a target
will go public. This laxity of process creates the risk that subpar firms will
trade side by side with quality public companies, tarnishing the market as a
whole.”166
A. Description of Topps
Topps provides the following general description in its merger
agreement with Mudrick Capital Acquisition Corporation II:
Topps is a global consumer products company that entertains and
delights consumers through a diverse, engaging, multi-platform
product portfolio that includes physical and digital collectibles,
trading cards, trading card games, sticker and album collections,
memorabilia, curated experiential events, gift cards and novelty
confections. Founded in 1938, we have evolved from a Brooklyn,
NY based family-owned chewing gum company to a global sports
and entertainment, digital/media and confections company. Our
diverse, yet complementary businesses and longstanding
relationships with many brands, celebrities, distributors, brick &
mortar and direct to consumer retailers and consumers have
created a strong foundation for growth. Our brand and retail
partnerships have been built on a long history of trust. Many of
our products have had a prominent position on retailers’ shelves
and check-out stands for decades. We have also forged strong
consumer
connections
through
our
worldwide ecommerce business, led by topps.com along with a portfolio of
mobile digital applications (“apps”) that were downloaded in over
100 countries last year. Finally, we operate a gift cards business
(“Gift Cards”) with a global platform that processed over
$1 billion in gift card sales for several leading digital companies
last year. We believe our years of experience, brand recognition
and customer engagement and loyalty lead to robust product
innovation and performance.
We have an attractive financial profile with recurring, organic net
sales growth, increasing margins, and a low level of capital
expenditures. These attributes allow us to generate significant free
cash flow. In fiscal year 2020, we generated $566.6 million in net
sales, $83.7 million in net income and $101.0 million in Adjusted
EBITDA. From fiscal year 2018 to fiscal year 2020, our net
income margin increased by 14.3 percentage points to 14.8% in

R9HX].
166. Id.
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2020 from 0.5% in 2018, and our Adjusted EBITDA margin grew
by 9.1 percentage points to 17.8% in 2020 from 8.7% in 2018. Our
focus on product and platform innovation has fueled expansion of
our digital businesses which has driven significant margin
expansion alongside strong revenue growth. Our net sales, net
income and Adjusted EBITDA in fiscal year 2020 reflect
compound annual growth rates of 11.9%, 491.9% and 60.3%,
respectively, since 2018. . . .
We produce and sell a diverse portfolio of multi-platform products
across two operating segments: Sports & Entertainment and
Confections.
Sports & Entertainment - Our Sports & Entertainment segment
produces products in the form of physical and digital collectibles
including trading cards, trading card games and sticker and album
collections and curated experiential events featuring sports and
entertainment personalities, as well as manages the gift card
programs for widely recognized global digital companies. We are
one of the oldest and most familiar brand names in the sports and
entertainment collectibles industry, and we strategically leverage
the Topps name throughout the segment’s portfolio. We have
longstanding relationships with key sports and entertainment
licensors and maintain distribution and marketing capabilities that
have enabled us to become the licensing partner of choice for
many of the most iconic global brands. We have enduring multiyear license agreements with widely recognized properties and an
increasing focus on international sports and entertainment
licenses, including a 70-year relationship with Major League
Baseball (“MLB”), a 43-year relationship with Lucasfilm for Star
Wars (The Walt Disney Company), a 15-year relationship with
World Wrestling Entertainment, a 12-year relationship with the
German Bundesliga (“Bundesliga”), a 7-year relationship with
Major League Soccer, a 6-year relationship with UEFA
Champions League and a 4-year relationship with the National
Hockey League. Most recently, we added Formula 1 and other
UEFA tournaments. We also have a collection of wholly-owned
proprietary intellectual property including Garbage Pail Kids,
Wacky Packages and Mars Attacks, and we license from third
parties other entertainment properties including Minions.
Our Physical Sports & Entertainment products are distributed
globally through over 580,000 retail outlets, as well as partner
websites. Digital Sports & Entertainment focuses on free-toplay apps. Our apps foster communities of users who collect and
purchase digital trading cards and other virtual goods and play
interactive contests. Our portfolio of apps is based on many
widely recognized sports and entertainment properties including
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the following apps (license partners): Topps BUNT (Major
League Baseball), Topps KICK (Major League Soccer, UEFA
Champions League and Bundesliga), Topps NHL Skate (National
Hockey League), Disney Collect! by Topps (The Walt Disney
Company), Marvel Collect! by Topps (Marvel/The Walt Disney
Company), Star Wars: Card Trader by Topps (Lucasfilm/The Walt
Disney Company) and Topps WWE Slam (World Wrestling
Entertainment). The average user rating of our apps is over four
out of five stars on both the Apple App and Google Play platforms.
In addition to mobile digital applications, we are focused on
developing digital collectibles that utilize blockchain technology
and successfully released several products in 2020 with more
planned in the near-term.
Our Gift Cards business is a leading processor, distributor and
program manager of prepaid gift cards and provider of cloudbased financial services and white label e-gift solutions for widely
recognized digital businesses that include Airbnb, Deliveroo,
DoorDash, Hulu, Instacart, Netflix, Nike, Twitch and Uber. We
manage our clients’ gift card programs through a network of over
four million worldwide locations, as well as partner websites. We
have generated over $1 billion of gift card sales for our partners in
fiscal year 2020.
Our Sports & Entertainment segment generated $368.2 million in
net sales and $88.4 million in Adjusted EBITDA (an Adjusted
EBITDA margin of 24.0%) for fiscal year 2020. Fiscal year 2020
net sales and Adjusted EBITDA reflect compound annual growth
rates of 28.0% and 122.7%, respectively, since Fiscal year 2018.
Confections - Using the Bazooka Candy Brands tradename, our
Confections segment produces, markets and distributes novelty
confections under iconic brands including Ring Pop, Push Pop,
Baby Bottle Pop, Juicy Drop, Finders Keepers, Mega Mouth,
Bazooka bubble gum and certain licensed products worldwide.
Our product lines include lollipops, gummies, and chewy candy;
however, we also have offerings in gum and chocolate. . . . Our
Confections products reach over 125,000 U.S. retail outlets
including leading mass merchants, warehouse clubs, grocery
stores, convenience stores, drug stores, home improvement stores,
discount chains, military outlets, e-commerce retailers, other
specialty accounts and also reach retail news and confections
outlets around the world. Confections generated $198.4 million in
net sales and $38.8 million in Adjusted EBITDA (an Adjusted
EBITDA margin of 19.5%) for fiscal year 2020.167

167. Mudrick Cap. Acquisition Corp. II, Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the
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In terms of Topps recent major developments, The Wall Street Journal
reports that, “Topps . . . recently expanded into nonfungible tokens, digital
assets also known as NFTs that use technology behind cryptocurrencies to
create unique tokens, each with its own identification that isn’t replicable.
These tokens serve as a digital deed for original editions of online art, music
and even memes.”168
B. Topps Merger Proposal
A description of the material terms of the transaction contained in the
Proxy Statement filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
form 14 A, dated July 30, 2021, consists of multiple thousands of words and
consumes many pages, far exceeding the space limitations imposed on any
one law review article. However, a sample of some of the relevant
information is reproduced here to acquaint the reader with a brief summary
of the transaction, as follows:
MUDS was organized to effect a merger, capital stock exchange,
asset acquisition, stock purchase, reorganization or other similar
business combination with one or more businesses.
On December 10, 2020, MUDS consummated its initial public
offering of 27,500,000 units. Each unit consists of one share of
Class A common stock and one-half of one redeemable warrant,
with each whole warrant entitling the holder thereof to purchase
one share of Class A common Stock at a purchase price of $11.50
per share, subject to adjustment, as provided in MUDS’ final
prospectus filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
December 9, 2020 (File No. 333-249402).
On December 14, 2020, the underwriters fully exercised their
over-allotment option, resulting in an additional 4,125,000 units
issued for an aggregate amount of $41,250,000. The units from
the MUDS IPO (including the exercise of the over-allotment
option) were sold at an offering price of $10.00 per unit,
generating gross proceeds to MUDS of $316,250,000. Since the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Schedule 14A) 181–82 (July 30, 2021),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1820727/000119312521231629/d161477ddefm14
a.htm [https://perma.cc/2L3J-NYEM] [hereinafter Mudrick Schedule 14A].
168.
See Sebastian, supra note 163 (describing Topps’ expansion into NFTs); see also
Lawrence J. Trautman, Virtual Art and Non-fungible Tokens, 50 HOFSTRA L. REV.
(forthcoming
2022),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3814087
[https://perma.cc/U328-M53Z] (describing how NFTs have expanded into the virtual art
space); Brian Elzweig & Lawrence J. Trautman, When Does A Nonfungible Token (NFT)
Become A Security?, http://ssrn.com/abstract=4055585 [https://perma.cc/SXX6-9KA4].

686

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 24:3

MUDS IPO, MUDS’ activity has been limited to the evaluation of
business combination opportunities.
Topps is a global consumer products company that entertains
and delights consumers through a diverse, engaging, multiplatform product portfolio that includes physical and digital
collectibles, trading cards, trading card games, sticker and album
collections, memorabilia, curated experiential events, gift cards
and novelty confections.
The MUDS Board, in evaluating the Transactions, consulted
with MUDS’ management and financial and legal advisors. In
reaching its unanimous resolution (i) that the Merger Agreement
and the Transactions are advisable and in the best interests of
MUDS and its stockholders and (ii) to recommend that the
stockholders adopt the Merger Agreement and approve the
business combination and the transactions contemplated thereby,
the MUDS Board considered and evaluated a number of factors,
including the factors discussed in this proxy statement. . . .169
Presented below are highlights from MUDD’s disclosure and
discussion of risk factors, where the issuer observes:
The following risk factors apply to the business and operations
of Topps and will also apply to the business and operations of the
post-combination company following the completion of the
business combination. The occurrence of one or more of the
events or circumstances described in these risk factors, alone or
in combination with other events or circumstances, may adversely
affect the ability to complete or realize the anticipated benefits of
the business combination, and may have an adverse effect on the
business, cash flows, financial condition and results of operations
of the post-combination company. . . .
RISKS RELATED TO TOPPS’ BUSINESS
ECONOMIC RISKS AND CURRENT EVENTS
The COVID-19 pandemic has had and may continue to have,
and other public health crises or epidemics could in the future
have, a material adverse impact on our business, operations,
financial condition, liquidity and results of operations. . . .
Reductions in discretionary consumer spending, including as a
result of global and regional economic downturns, could have an
adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of
operations. . . .
OPERATIONAL RISKS
169. See Mudrick Schedule 14A, supra note 167, at 12–13 (describing the business history
of MUDS).
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If we do not effectively maintain and further develop our
relationships with retail customers and distributors, our business,
financial condition, and results of operations could be harmed. If
our distributors fail to promote our products and services actively
and effectively, or if they implement operational decisions that are
inconsistent with our interests, our future growth and results of
operations may suffer. . . .
We depend upon third-party manufacturers, and if our
relationship with any of them is harmed or if they encounter
difficulties in their manufacturing processes, we could experience
product defects, production delays, unplanned costs or higher
product costs, or the inability to fulfill orders on a timely basis,
any of which could adversely affect our business, financial
condition, and results of operations. . . .
Damage to our reputation could have a material adverse effect
on our business, financial condition, and results of operations. . .
.
Our business depends in large part on our vendors and
outsourcers, and our ability to effectively operate our business, as
well as our reputation, may be harmed by actions taken by these
third parties outside of our control. . . .
Our operating results may fluctuate from quarter to quarter
and year to year due to the seasonality of our business and the
timing of new product releases. . . . .
We are subject to risks from unanticipated business
disruptions. . . .
Our success is critically dependent on the efforts and
dedication of our officers and other employees, and the loss of one
or more key employees, or our inability to attract and retain
qualified personnel, could adversely affect our business. . . .
Our decision to accept and hold cryptocurrency, such as
bitcoin, may subject us to exchange risk and additional tax and
regulatory requirements. . . .
Our principal asset is our interest in The Topps Company, Inc.,
and we are, and expect to continue to be, dependent upon the
results of operations and cash flows of The Topps Company, Inc.
and its consolidated subsidiaries and distributions we receive
from The Topps Company, Inc. . . .
REGULATORY RISKS
A failure to comply with laws and regulations relating to
privacy and the protection of data relating to individuals and
certain audiences may result in negative publicity, claims,
investigations and litigation and adversely affect our financial
performance. . . .

687

688

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 24:3

We operate in a highly and increasingly regulated
environment, and the failure by us or the businesses that
participate in our distribution network to comply with applicable
laws and regulations could have a material adverse effect on our
business, financial condition and results of operations. . . .
We could be subject to future product liability suits or product
recalls which could have a significant adverse effect on our
business, financial condition and results of operations. . . .
Our Confections business is subject to local, national and
multinational regulations related to labeling, health and nutrient
claims, packaging, pricing, marketing and advertising and other
related areas. . . .
STRATEGIC RISKS
Our success and ability to maintain and grow our business
depend on our ability to execute our business strategy, along with
a number of factors which are outside of our control. . . .
Our business is largely dependent on content development and
creation by third parties. . . .
We have an evolving business model and have been expanding
our digital ecosystems. . . .
STRATEGIC RISKS IN OUR SPORTS & ENTERTAINMENT BUSINESS
The growth of our Digital Sports & Entertainment business will
depend on our ability to attract and retain users, and the loss of
our users, failure to attract new users in a cost-effective manner,
or failure to effectively manage our growth could adversely affect
our business, financial condition and results of operations. . . .
We cannot assure you that we will be able to design and
develop products that will be popular with consumers, or that we
will be able to maintain the popularity of successful products. A
sustained decline in the popularity of certain types of collectibles
and a resulting decrease in demand for our products could
adversely impact our business, financial condition and results of
operations. . . .
Consumer demand for sports and entertainment products can
and does shift rapidly and without warning. . . .
If the mobile applications market fails to grow or is disrupted
by new technologies, and we are not able to appropriately adapt
our business, our business will suffer. . . .
Changes in the retail industry and hobby industry and markets
for consumer products affecting our retail and hobby customers of
our Physical Sports & Entertainment business could negatively
impact our business, financial condition and results of operations.
...
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STRATEGIC RISKS IN OUR CONFECTIONS BUSINESS
We must continue to offer new and innovative confections
products that meet our consumers’ expectations. An inability to
develop and introduce confections products in a timely and costeffective manner may damage our business. . . .
Obesity and other health-related concerns may reduce demand
for our Confections products. . . .
INDUSTRY RISKS
Our industry is intensely competitive and subject to rapid
changes, including technological changes, which may materially
and adversely affect our revenues and profitability. If we are
unable to compete effectively with existing or new competitors, our
sales, market share and profitability could decline. . . .
Competition for access to the intellectual property we license
is intense, and we must vigorously compete to obtain licenses to
the intellectual property we need to produce our products. . . .
Our Gift Cards business could suffer if there is a decline in the
attractiveness of gift cards to consumers. . . .
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS RISKS
Our businesses are subject to risks associated with doing
business outside of the United States. . . .
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY RISKS
Despite our security measures, our information technology and
infrastructure may be vulnerable to attacks by hackers or
breached due to employee error, malfeasance or other
disruptions. Any such breach could compromise our networks and
the information stored there could be accessed, publicly disclosed,
lost or stolen . . ..170
170. See Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, Industrial Cyber Vulnerabilities:
Lessons from Stuxnet and the Internet of Things, 72 U. MIAMI L. REV. 761 (2018),
(https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2982629)
[https://perma.cc/HQR4ALFD]; Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, WannaCry, Ransomware, and the
Emerging Threat to Corporations, 86 TENN. L. REV. 503 (2019),
(https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3238293)
[https://perma.cc/UR897Y7H]; Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Cyberattack The Next Pearl Harbor?, 18 N.C. J. L. & TECH.
232
(2016),
(https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2711059)
[https://perma.cc/F9E8-SZUF]; Lawrence J. Trautman, Managing Cyberthreat, 33 SANTA
CLARA
HIGH
TECH.
L.J.
230
(2016),
(https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2534119)
[https://perma.cc/7L92B96E]; Lawrence J. Trautman, E-Commerce, Cyber and Electronic Payment System Risks:
Lessons from PayPal, 17 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L. J. 261 (Spring 2016),
(https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2314119)
[https://perma.cc/7FFC-
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Systems failures and resulting interruptions in the availability
of our Digital Sports & Entertainment applications, Gift Cards or
platform could adversely affect our business, financial condition,
and results of operations. . . .
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND LICENSE RISKS
We may not realize the full benefit of our licenses if the licensed
material has less market appeal than expected, or if revenue from
the licensed property does not exceed minimum guaranteed
royalties. . . .
Our current licenses require us to pay minimum royalties. . . .
Our business is highly dependent upon our license agreements
with third parties, and a limited number of our licensors account
for a large portion of our net sales. If we lose a license, we may
not be able to ensure our consumers have continued access to the
digital assets created under that license. In addition, such licenses
may be difficult and expensive to obtain and, in some cases, retain.
...
If we or our licensors are unable to obtain, maintain and
protect our intellectual property rights, in particular trademarks
and copyrights, our ability to compete could be negatively
impacted. . . .
Failure to adequately protect the confidentiality of our trade
secrets, know-how, proprietary applications, business processes
and other proprietary information could adversely affect the value
of our technology and products. . . .
LIQUIDITY AND FINANCING RISKS
Our indebtedness could adversely affect our financial health
and competitive position. . . .
RISKS RELATED TO MUDS AND THE BUSINESS COMBINATION
MUDS’ initial stockholders have agreed to vote in favor of the
business combination, regardless of how MUDS’ public
stockholders vote. . . .
The Sponsor, certain members of the MUDS Board and certain
MUDS officers have interests in the business combination that are
different from or are in addition to other stockholders in
recommending that stockholders vote in favor of approval of the
business combination proposal and approval of the other
A89G]; Lawrence J. Trautman, How Google Perceives Customer Privacy, Cyber, ECommerce, Political and Regulatory Compliance Risks, 10 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1
(2018),
(https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3067298)
[https://perma.cc/4YT2-F6MU].
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proposals described in this proxy statement. . . .
The NASDAQ may not continue to list our securities, which
could limit investors’ ability to make transactions in our securities
and subject us to additional trading restrictions. . . .
The MUDS Board did not obtain a third-party valuation or
fairness opinion in determining whether or not to proceed with the
business combination. . . .
Because the post-combination company will become a
publicly-traded company by virtue of a merger as opposed to an
underwritten initial public offering, the process does not use the
services of one or more underwriters, which could result in less
diligence being conducted. . . .
Future resales of our outstanding shares may cause the market
price of our securities to drop significantly, even if our business is
doing well. . . .
If third parties bring claims against MUDS, the proceeds held
in the trust account could be reduced and the pershare redemption amount received by stockholders may be less
than $10.15 per share. In such event, MUDS directors may decide
not to enforce the indemnification obligation of the Sponsor,
resulting in a reduction in the amount of funds in the trust account
available for distribution to public stockholders. . . .
The exercise of MUDS’ directors’ and officers’ discretion in
agreeing to changes or waivers in the terms of the Transactions
may result in a conflict of interest when determining whether such
changes to the terms of the Transactions or waivers of conditions
are appropriate and in MUDS stockholders’ best interest. . . .
If MUDS is unable to complete the Transactions or another
initial business combination by September 10, 2022 MUDS will
cease all operations except for the purpose of winding up,
redeeming 100% of the outstanding public shares and, subject to
the approval of its remaining stockholders and the MUDS Board,
dissolving and liquidating. In such event, third parties may bring
claims against MUDS and, as a result, the proceeds held in the
trust account could be reduced and the per-share liquidation price
received by stockholders could be less than $10.15 per share. . . .
MUDS stockholders may be held liable for claims by third
parties against MUDS to the extent of distributions received by
them. . . .
Activities taken by existing MUDS stockholders to increase the
likelihood of approval of the business combination proposal and
the other proposals described in this proxy statement could have
a depressive effect on MUDS’ stock. . . .
A significant portion of Class A common stock following the
business combination will be restricted from immediate resale, but
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may be sold into the market in the future. This could cause the
market price of Class A common stock to drop significantly, even
if our business is doing well. . . .
The Sponsor, Tornante, MDP and the PIPE Investors will
beneficially own a significant equity interest in MUDS and may
take actions that conflict with your interests. . . .
We will qualify as, and intend to elect to be treated as, a
“controlled company” within the meaning of the NASDAQ listing
standards and, as a result, our stockholders may not have certain
corporate governance protections that are available to
stockholders of companies that are not controlled companies. . . .
Our dual class capital structure will have the effect of
concentrating voting power with Tornante, which will limit an
investor’s ability to influence the outcome of important
transactions, including a change in control. . . .
We cannot predict the impact our dual class capital structure
may have on the stock price of Class A common stock. . . .
MUDS stockholders who do not redeem their public shares will
experience immediate dilution as a consequence of the issuance of
shares as consideration in the business combination and may
experience dilution from several additional sources in connection
with and after the business combination. Having a minority share
position may reduce the influence that MUDS’ current
stockholders have on the management of MUDS. . . .
We have no operating history and our results of operations and
those of the post-combination company may differ significantly
from the unaudited pro forma financial data included in this proxy
statement. . . .
Our warrants are accounted for as liabilities and the changes
in value of our warrants could have a material effect on our
financial results. . . .
We have identified a material weakness in our internal control
over financial reporting as of December 31, 2020. If we are unable
to develop and maintain an effective system of internal control
over financial reporting, or if we identify additional material
weaknesses in the future or otherwise fail to maintain effective
internal control over financial reporting, we may not be able to
accurately report our financial results in a timely manner, which
may adversely affect investor confidence in us and materially and
adversely affect our business and operating results. . . .
We and, following the Transactions, the post-combination
company, may face litigation and other risks as a result of the
material weakness in our internal control over financial reporting.
...
Topps’ financial forecasts, which were presented to the MUDS
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Board and are included in this proxy statement, may not prove
accurate. . . .
Termination of the Merger Agreement could negatively impact
MUDS. . . .
Even if MUDS consummates the business combination, there is
no guarantee that the public warrants will ever be in the money,
and they may expire worthless and the terms of the warrants may
be amended. . . .
If MUDS is unable to complete an initial business combination,
MUDS’ warrants may expire worthless. . . .
MUDS may redeem the unexpired public warrants prior to
their exercise at a time and at a price that is disadvantageous to
public warrant holders, thereby making their public warrants
worthless, and exercise of a significant number of the public
warrants could adversely affect the market price of Class A
common stock. . . .
Our ability to successfully effect the business combination and
to be successful thereafter will be dependent upon the efforts of
certain key personnel, including the key personnel of Topps. The
loss of key personnel could negatively impact the operations and
profitability of our post-combination business and its financial
condition could suffer as a result. . . .
MUDS and Topps will be subject to business uncertainties and
contractual restrictions while the business combination is
pending. . . .
We will be required to pay Topps stockholders for a significant
portion of the tax benefits relating to pre-business combination tax
assets and attributes and such payments may exceed the amount
of any tax savings realized. . . .
Unanticipated changes in effective tax rates or adverse
outcomes resulting from examination of our income or other tax
returns could adversely affect our financial condition and results
of operations. . . .
Subsequent to the completion of the business combination,
MUDS may be required to take write-downs or write-offs,
restructuring and impairment or other charges that could have a
significant negative effect on MUDS’ financial condition, results
of operations and MUDS’ stock price, which could cause you to
lose some or all of your investment. . . .
Following the consummation of the business combination, our
only significant asset will be our ownership interest in the Topps
business and such ownership may not be sufficiently profitable or
valuable to enable us to pay any dividends on our Class A common
stock or satisfy our other financial obligations. . . .
Delaware law, the Charter and the Amended and Restated
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Bylaws will contain certain provisions, including anti-takeover
provisions, that limit the ability of stockholders to take certain
actions and could delay or discourage takeover attempts that
stockholders may consider favorable. . . .
The Charter designates a state court within the State of
Delaware, to the fullest extent permitted by law, as the sole and
exclusive forum for certain types of actions and proceedings that
may be initiated by stockholders, which could limit the ability of
stockholders to obtain a favorable judicial forum for disputes with
or with our directors, officers or employees and may discourage
stockholders from bringing such claims. . . .
Subsequent to the completion of the business combination, we
may be required to take write-downs or write-offs, restructuring
and impairment or other charges that could have a significant
negative effect on our financial condition, results of operations
and our stock price, which could cause you to lose some or all of
your investment. . . .
If the business combination’s benefits do not meet the
expectations of investors, stockholders or financial analysts, the
market price of our securities may decline. . . .
Our quarterly operating results may fluctuate significantly
following the business combination. . . .
There is no guarantee that an active and liquid public market
for shares of the Class A common stock will develop. . . .
We may be unable to obtain additional financing to fund our
operations or growth. . . .
Changes in laws, regulations or rules, or a failure to comply
with any laws, regulations or rules, may adversely affect our
business, investments and results of operations. . . .
The JOBS Act permits “emerging growth companies” like us
to take advantage of certain exemptions from various reporting
requirements applicable to other public companies that are not
emerging growth companies. . . .
RISKS RELATED TO THE REDEMPTION
You must tender your shares of Class A common stock in order
to validly seek redemption at the special meeting. . . .
MUDS does not have a specified maximum redemption
threshold. The absence of such a redemption threshold may make
it possible for us to complete a business combination with which a
substantial majority of MUDS stockholders do not agree. . . .
Public stockholders, together with any affiliates of theirs or any
other person with whom they are acting in concert or as a
“group,” will be restricted from seeking redemption rights with
respect to more than 20% of the public shares. . . .
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We cannot be certain as to the number of public shares that will
be redeemed and the potential impact to stockholders who do not
elect to redeem their public shares. . . .171
It is often possible to learn as much, if not more, from failures than
successes. As an indication of just how fragile some of these transactions
can be, during August 2021, “[t]he deal fell through by mutual agreement
after MLB [Major League Baseball] and the Major League Baseball Players
Association both reached new exclusive licensing deals with Fanatics, Inc.,
an online sports-merchandise retailer, starting in the coming years.”172 Then,
during January 2022, “Fanatics . . . struck a $500 million deal to purchase
Topp’s trading card business itself. . . . The sale comes less than five months
after the deals struck by Fanatics scuttled Topps’s plan to go public in a
blank-check merger.”173
VI.

SEC DEVELOPMENTS

Writing during April 2021, Acting Director of the Division of
Corporation Finance John Coates states, “Over the past six months, the U.S.
securities markets have seen an unprecedented surge in the use and
popularity of Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (or SPACs).”174
Director Coates continues, “Shareholder advocates – as well as business
journalists and legal and banking practitioners, and even SPAC enthusiasts
themselves – are sounding alarms about the surge.”175 Particular concerns
and warnings, “include risks from fees, conflicts, and sponsor compensation,
from celebrity sponsorship and the potential for retail participation drawn by
baseless hype, and the sheer amount of capital pouring into the SPACs, each
of which is designed to hunt for a private target to take public.”176 As a result,
Director Coates cautions:
With the unprecedented surge has come unprecedented scrutiny,
171. See Mudrick Schedule 14A, supra note 167, at 48–94 (summarizing the different
categories of risks taken from MUDS’s disclosure statement).
172. Matt Grossman, Topps SPAC Merger Collapses After Loss of MLB Trading-Card
Deal, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/topps-spac-mergercollapses-after-loss-of-mlb-playing-card-deal-11629463989 [perma.cc/TXA3-MDKX].
173. Jared Diamond & Andrew Beaton, Fanatics Inc. to Buy Topps Card Business, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 4, 2022, at B1; see also Lauren Hirsch, In $500 Million trading Card Deal,
Fanatics Buys Topps, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2022, at B5 (discussing the deal in further detail).
174. John Coates, Acting Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., Statement on SPACs, IPOs and Liability
Risk under the Securities Laws, SEC (Apr. 8, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/publicstatement/spacs-ipos-liability-risk-under-securities-laws [https://perma.cc/2TNX-X2J3].
175. Id.
176. Id.
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and new issues with both standard and innovative SPAC structures
keep surfacing.
The staff at the Securities and Exchange Commission are
continuing to look carefully at filings and disclosures by SPACs
and their private targets. As customary, and in keeping with the
Division of Corporation Finance’s ordinary practices, staff are
reviewing these filings, seeking clearer disclosure, and providing
guidance to registrants and the public. They will continue to be
vigilant about SPAC and private target disclosure so that the public
can make informed investment and voting decisions about these
transactions.177
Cornell University Law School student James Rowe states in his thesis,
“My qualitative research uncovered an outsized role played by the U.S.
Government in the growth and popularity of SPACs.”178 Mr. Rowe contends,
“Additionally, precedent research demonstrated that the U.S. Federal
Government’s proposed solution of additional regulations will not work and
will, instead, create a new alternative investment vehicle in the same fashion
that overregulation of IPOs led to SPACs.”179 Consider:
To solve the concerns regulators have voiced, officials charged
with developing and altering the IPO regulatory framework must
loosen the grip of listing-crushing regulations. If smaller
businesses were able to access the markets via an IPO, they would
do so because there is more certainty in the legal grounding of an
IPO, and the process is an established one familiar to the business
world. Any actions, on the government’s part, to tighten already
strangling regulations will lead to more of the same.180
A. Example of Recent Enforcement Action: Momentus Inc.
Exhibit 4 illustrates just one example of an SEC enforcement action
charges brought against an issuer and certain individuals regarding SPAC
misleading disclosures.181

177. Id.
178. James Rowe, Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs): The Private Sector’s
Solution to Government Overreach (May 21, 2021) (J.D. thesis, Cornell University Law
School), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3851605 [https://perma.cc/CZ3N-94AC].
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Press Release 2021-124, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges SPAC, Sponsor,
Merger Target, and CEOs for Misleading Disclosures Ahead of Proposed Business
Combination
(Jul.
13,
2021),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-124
[https://perma.cc/MU38-Y2P4].
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Exhibit 4
Enforcement Action in the Matter of Momentus Inc.
Press Release
SEC Charges SPAC, Sponsor, Merger Target, and CEOs for Misleading
Disclosures Ahead of Proposed Business Combination
Charges Relate to Planned Merger of Stable Road Acquisition
Company and Space Transportation Company Momentus Inc.
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2021-124
Washington D.C., July 13, 2021 —
The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced charges
against special purpose acquisition corporation Stable Road Acquisition
Company, its sponsor SRC-NI, its CEO Brian Kabot, the SPAC’s proposed
merger target Momentus Inc., and Momentus’s founder and former CEO
Mikhail Kokorich for misleading claims about Momentus’s technology and
about national security risks associated with Kokorich. The SEC’s litigation
is proceeding against Kokorich, against whom the SEC filed a complaint in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. All other parties are
settling with the SEC, with terms including total penalties of more than $8
million, tailored investor protection undertakings, and the SPAC sponsor’s
forfeiture of founder’s shares it stands to receive if the merger, currently
scheduled for August 2021, is approved.
According to the SEC’s settled order, Kokorich and Momentus, an
early-stage space transportation company, repeatedly told investors that it
had “successfully tested” its propulsion technology in space when, in fact,
the company’s only in-space test had failed to achieve its primary mission
objectives or demonstrate the technology’s commercial viability. The order
finds that Momentus and Kokorich also misrepresented the extent to which
national security concerns involving Kokorich undermined Momentus’s
ability to secure required governmental licenses essential to its operations.
In addition, the order finds that Stable Road repeated Momentus’s
misleading statements in public filings associated with the proposed merger
and failed its due diligence obligations to investors. According to the order,
while Stable Road claimed to have conducted extensive due diligence of
Momentus, it never reviewed the results of Momentus’s in-space test or
received sufficient documents relevant to assessing the national security
risks posed by Kokorich. The order finds that Kabot participated in Stable
Road’s inadequate due diligence and in filing its inaccurate registration
statements and proxy solicitations. The SEC’s complaint against Kokorich
includes factual allegations that are consistent with the findings in the order.
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“This case illustrates risks inherent to SPAC transactions, as those who
stand to earn significant profits from a SPAC merger may conduct
inadequate due diligence and mislead investors,” said SEC Chair Gary
Gensler. “Stable Road, a SPAC, and its merger target, Momentus, both
misled the investing public. The fact that Momentus lied to Stable Road
does not absolve Stable Road of its failure to undertake adequate due
diligence to protect shareholders. Today’s actions will prevent the
wrongdoers from benefitting at the expense of investors and help to better
align the incentives of parties to a SPAC transaction with those of investors
relying on truthful information to make investment decisions.”
“Our enforcement team worked with incredible speed, efficiency, and
creativity to file today’s actions so that investors will have the benefit of
complete and accurate information when voting on the proposed merger,”
said Melissa R. Hodgman, Acting Director of the SEC’s Division of
Enforcement. “Today’s settlement will deter future misconduct in the SPAC
market without inhibiting capital formation, while also allowing for the
distribution of monetary relief to harmed investors.”
“Momentus’s former CEO is alleged to have engaged in fraud by
misrepresenting the viability of the company’s technology and his status as
a national security threat, inducing shareholders to approve a merger in
which he stood to obtain shares worth upwards of $200 million,” said Anita
B. Bandy, Associate Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement. “Our
litigation against Kokorich demonstrates our commitment to holding
individuals accountable for their statements to investors, which are of
particular concern when they are aimed at improperly capitalizing on public
interest in popular investment vehicles such as SPACs.”
The SEC’s order finds that Momentus violated scienter-based antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws and caused certain of Stable Road’s
violations. It also finds that Stable Road violated negligence-based antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws as well as certain reporting and
proxy solicitation provisions. The order finds that Kabot violated provisions
of the federal securities laws related to proxy solicitations and that Kabot and
SRC-NI caused Stable Road’s violation of Section 17(a)(3) of the Securities
Act of 1933. Without admitting or denying the SEC’s findings, Momentus,
Stable Road, Kabot, and SRC-NI consented to an order requiring them to
cease and desist from future violations. Momentus, Stable Road, and Kabot
will pay civil penalties of $7 million, $1 million, and $40,000, respectively.
Momentus and Stable Road have also agreed to provide PIPE (private
investment in public equity) investors with the right to terminate their
subscription agreements prior to the shareholder vote to approve the merger;
SRC-NI has agreed to forfeit 250,000 founders’ shares it would otherwise
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have received upon consummation of the business combination; and
Momentus has agreed to undertakings requiring enhancements to its
disclosure controls, including the creation of an independent board
committee and retention of an internal compliance consultant for a period of
two years.
The SEC’s complaint against Kokorich alleges that Kokorich violated
antifraud provisions of the securities laws and aided and abetted Momentus’s
violations of the same provisions. The complaint seeks permanent
injunctions, penalties, disgorgement plus prejudgment interest, and an
officer-and-director bar against Kokorich.182
VII.

CONCLUSION

During late 2020 and 2021 an unprecedented surge in the popularity
and issuance of Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACSs) takes
place. When discussing SPACs, John Coates, Acting Director of the SEC’s
Division of Corporation Finance, observes, “Concerns include risks from
fees, conflicts, and sponsor compensation, from celebrity sponsorship and
the potential for retail participation drawn by baseless hype, and the sheer
amount of capital pouring into the SPACS, each of which is designed to hunt
for a private target to take public.”183 We believe this paper adds to the
discussion and understanding of this widely employed financing mechanism.

182. Id.
183. Coates, supra note 174.

